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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As the negotiating period for finalising the new Basel Capital Accord 
(hereafter ‘Basel II’) drew to a close, there were serious apprehensions 
among industry members that the likely high capital charge would 
discourage banks from granting loans to small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), thereby triggering a shortage of finance for this sector. 
It was thought that this situation would damage the EU economy since 
SMEs, which are known to be the most important source of growth and 
employment creation in the EU, already suffer from financing problems. 
These concerns were partially assuaged when the Basel Committee 
introduced a more favourable treatment of SME portfolios under pillar 1, 
based on empirical evidence suggesting that SMEs have a lower default 
correlation than large enterprises. This finding in turn suggests that the 
lower the default correlation among SMEs, the fewer the number of firms 
in this sector that are affected by the same macroeconomic factors and the 
more the default is related to idiosyncratic or firm-specific risks. 
Nevertheless, the more risk-sensitive pricing introduced by the internal 
ratings-based approaches under pillar 1 of Basel II will certainly entail 
variation in capital adequacy, depending upon the individual quality of the 
SME. Indeed, a poor-quality (low-rated) SME will force the bank to hold 
more regulatory capital compared to a high-quality (highly rated) SME. 
This situation does not curtail loan financing for SMEs, but it does make its 
availability conditional on the enterprise’s financial strength and ability to 
provide relevant quantitative and qualitative information.  
This study discusses the main characteristics of the SME sector in 
Europe and provides an informative analysis about what Basel II means for 
SMEs and its impact on their credit financing conditions. It also presents a ii | RYM AYADI 
 
detailed analysis of how banks formulate an internal rating system and 
illustrates how this system works in practice. Finally, it concludes with the 
key measures that should be taken by banks, SMEs and public policy-
makers to improve SME financing in the new rating culture. The 
conclusions of the study are summarised below.  
1.  The evolution of SME financing by banks 
Despite the slowdown of the overall growth rate in bank lending to SMEs 
in the past few years – reflecting the weak economic cycle, reduced 
demand and more selective lending – banks in Europe seem to see real 
growth opportunities in the SME lending sector. In parallel, although SMEs 
have access to a variety of financing sources, including leasing, factoring 
and trade credit, they rely heavily on bank financing. Nevertheless, several 
constraints continue to hinder SME financing in line with firms’ natural 
growth cycle. According to banks, the lack of equity, the high credit risk, 
the paucity of collateral and poor information about the firms constitute the 
main obstacles to granting finance to SMEs. Other constraints that play a 
role in the assessment of loan applications, such as poor entrepreneurial 
capacity, business performance and uncertain development prospects, are 
felt to be equally important.  
Today, bank financing requires a large amount of financial and 
strategic information that ought to be p r o v i d e d  b y  S M E s  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  
information deficit between them and their lenders. Faced with 
implementing the requirements of Basel II worldwide and the new Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD) in the EU, banks are expected to require 
even more and better quality information. The new regulatory rules have 
introduced more stringent requirements to counter the growing concern of 
risks at the EU and global levels. This step does not imply credit rationing. 
Instead, it requires banks to view their business in a more sophisticated and 
risk-sensitive manner. As a consequence, SMEs need to understand these 
regulatory changes as they will impact their financing conditions to a 
certain degree – not necessarily by reducing their credit facilities but by 
rendering the whole process more risk-sensitive and contingent upon the 
individual quality of the borrowers.  
2.  The future shape of decision-making for bank credit 
Banks derive a credit rating and thus the probability of default associated 
with the borrower through four stages:  THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND SME FINANCING | iii 
 
i)  the gathering of historical quantitative and qualitative information;  
ii)  an analysis of the individual factors;  
iii)  the specification and estimation of the model; and 
iv)  the determination of the rating and the associated probability of 
default.  
In the first stage, accurate and relevant quantitative and qualitative 
data are collected. The quantitative data (mainly extracted from financial 
statements) include: performance, leverage, debt coverage, liquidity, 
growth, productivity, size and other macroeconomic and political factors as 
well as a detailed and precise business plan. The qualitative data include: 
the profile of the enterprise, the development prospects of the industry, the 
reputation/experience/ability of the entrepreneur and his/her past credit 
history, the ownership and governance structure, the management quality 
of accounts receivable and the availability of collateral and guarantees, etc.  
These data are traditionally required when SMEs ask for loans under 
the current Basel regulation (the 1988 Accord). With the implementation of 
Basel II and the transposition of the CRD into national laws from the end of 
2006, banks will ask for even more information. This information must be 
clear, focused, complete, more structured and timely. The decision to grant 
credit will be highly conditional on the individual quality of the borrower.  
Formally, the new banking regulation will have more impact on the 
second, third and fourth stages of deriving a rating. Indeed, the 
information submitted will be interpreted using statistical models that 
extract more decision-relevant information for rating and probability of 
default. This enhances the bank’s ability to identify potential future 
defaults. Cross-subsidisation between high-quality and poor-quality 
borrowers will no longer be allowed. In addition, it is expected that the 
current trend towards collateralised lending as a means to mitigate credit 
risk and to allow the calculation of recovery rates is likely to rise. 
3.  Practical effects of Basel II and the CRD on SME financing  
The new banking capital rules will directly affect three components of the 
cost of credit to SMEs, as follows:  
•  The administrative/operational costs resulting from processes to initiate 
and manage loan portfolios may increase, owing to the use of more 
sophisticated risk-management tools that require a greater 
investment in human resources and infrastructure (to undertake data iv | RYM AYADI 
 
collection, database maintenance and adequate modelling, for 
example).  
•  The rules will also have an impact on the cost of risk, composed of the 
cost of capital, which is the opportunity cost resulting from the fact 
that banks need regulatory and risk capital to cover loan exposures. 
•  Finally, there will be an effect on the risk premium, which is linked to 
the probability of default of the borrower, the exposure at default and 
the loss-given default.  
The impact of the new banking regulatory rules on the cost of risk 
and the risk premium is not straightforward since it will largely depend on 
the risk characteristics of the borrowers. 
The more risk-sensitive pricing introduced by the new rules through 
the internal ratings-based approaches will entail a certain variation in 
capital adequacy, which is ultimately related to the individual quality of 
the borrowers. A poor-quality borrower will force its lender to hold more 
regulatory capital compared with a better-quality borrower, but this does 
not reduce loan financing. 
4.  The role of banks and the key success factors for a better financing relationship 
between banks and SMEs 
Enhanced transparency, structured dialogue, openness and communication 
are the cornerstones of an effective cooperation between banks and SMEs. 
These principles will ensure a successful financing relationship.  
Banks should not hesitate to play their role and increase transparency 
with their customers by showing them how ratings impact their credit 
terms. Communication should not be limited to the reasons for not 
granting bank loans or withdrawing existing lines of credit. Rather, it 
should be built upon mutual trust between banks and SMEs. Bank 
procedures including individual rating, risk assessment and factors for 
downgrading or upgrading credit risk need to be more transparent to SMEs.  
Disclosing the key elements of the risk assessment process is 
necessary to allow loan applicants to understand bank decisions (rejection, 
acceptance, improved or worsening financing conditions, etc.). In the 
meantime, explaining the overall, detailed risk-assessment process should 
not create an extra burden for the bank since the extra cost of mobilising 
additional human resources could be passed on to the SMEs.  THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND SME FINANCING | v 
 
It is notable, however, that as the application of different internal 
rating methodologies (the foundation versus the advanced internal ratings 
approaches) will imply different ratings for the same quality of borrower, 
the disclosure of individual ratings to loan applicants may result in a 
competitive disadvantage for those banks that should normally be 
rewarded for their use of the most sophisticated internal models to rate 
credit risk and detect potentially bad borrowers.  
Although the key elements disclosed should be clearly defined, it is 
not necessary at this stage to explicitly regulate the disclosure of ratings to 
loan applicants. A non-legislative code of conduct between banks and 
SMEs should suffice to establish a framework that sets out the principles 
for rating-process disclosure for banking and SME associations.  
5.  The role of SMEs and the practical actions they can take to improve their 
financing conditions  
The steps that SMEs need to take are obviously expected to be even greater 
than banks. SMEs need to be aware of the changing banking environment. 
Indeed, this awareness will increase their ability to identify better financing 
options.  
When applying for a loan from an internal ratings-based bank, an 
enterprise needs to signal its creditworthiness by providing clear, focused, 
complete, well-structured and timely quantitative and qualitative 
information. This information is the key to running the internal ratings 
system properly. Companies that are well-managed, adequately leveraged 
(equity ratio) and that provide such information will be in a position to 
obtain a good rating and consequently better credit conditions.  
In practice, SMEs must: 
•  provide timely, relevant and precise financial data and demonstrate 
financial performance needed by lenders to assign yearly ratings. 
Delayed submission of financial and performance data is seen to be a 
warning signal by many banks’ internal rating systems. It usually 
leads to a downgrading of creditworthiness and therefore price 
increases in loan offers or the refusal of new loans;  
•  improve the factors that are considered to be important in the ratings 
process, such as: 
o  cash-flow stabilisation and generation; 
o  company accounting, control and management methods;  vi | RYM AYADI 
 
o  the equity base, by giving preference to retained earnings over 
distributed profits;  
o  consolidation of the business development strategy;  
o  strategic thinking among managers in terms of business prospects 
and market/sector/activity analyses; 
o  external communications with stakeholders;  
o  provision of adequate guarantees and collaterals;  
o  attention given to some aspects of the business that may have 
been neglected so far; 
o  establishment of recovery procedures in case of distress scenarios; 
•  take more active measures to increase equity finance; and  
•  consider alternative financing sources to banks, such as leasing, 
factoring or other means that could offer a good response to SMEs.  
6.  The role of public policy-makers to intervene when necessary 
It is important to continue improving the relationship between banks and 
SMEs in terms of a better rating culture by developing a non-legislative 
framework that sets out the principles to define the minimum criteria for 
ratings disclosure. Moreover, since a stronger equity base is an indicator of 
better creditworthiness, it is important to ensure greater access to equity 
finance and to offer more tax incentives to use retained earnings to increase 
the equity base. Finally, the legislative efforts to combat habitual late 
payments and thus stabilise cash flows should continue and be reinforced.  
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INTRODUCTION 
It is widely accepted that the SME sector plays a central role in promoting 
employment, growth and innovation in Europe. Therefore, it is very 
important to ensure that financing conditions for SMEs are not overly tight 
because of more stringent capital rules, particularly when they already 
have difficulties in accessing finance in capital markets given their limited 
size and reputation.  
SMEs in a number of EU countries have expressed concerns about the 
likely impact that the European version of the new Basel Capital Accord 
(Basel II) and the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) could have on 
their access to credit and the related costs that this may entail. In this 
context it is useful to start with a brief history of the treatment of SME 
financing under Basel II.  
In July 2002, the Basel Committee agreed to grant loans to SMEs 
under a special and more favourable treatment framework. According to 
the current Basel II and CRD proposals, SME funding by the banks using 
either the standardised or internal ratings-based (IRB) approach will in 
general be given a lower capital requirement than loans to larger firms. The 
capital savings, which may be as high as 20%, result from the application of 
a reduction mechanism (discount factor) that corrects the asset risk weights 
on the basis of the borrower’s size.1 By allowing this special regime, the 
Basel Committee finally put an end to the long and heated debate that had 
flared up, particularly across Europe, after the release of the second 
consultation paper in January 2001.  
                                                      
1 The firm-size adjustment factor is an algorithm that modifies the asset correlation 
in reverse proportion to the SME’s size. 2 | RYM AYADI 
 
In theory, the SMEs’ concerns should have disappeared after they 
were accorded this preferential regulatory capital treatment. In practice, 
however, the new Capital Accord has introduced a very risk-selective 
approach: indeed, the more risk a borrower entails, the higher the capital 
charge will be. In other words, an SME that has a good business plan but 
inadequate equity and volatile cash-flows will accrue a higher cost of 
credit. 
These concerns still have some foundation, as little is known about 
the immediate implications of new regulations when they are first 
introduced. These concerns may be alleviated, however, by becoming 
informed about the new regulation, its likely implications and the way in 
which banks will use internal rating systems to assess SME 
creditworthiness.  
This study discusses the main characteristics of the SME sector in 
Europe and provides an analysis of what Basel II means for SMEs and its 
impact on their credit financing conditions. It also presents a detailed look 
at how banks formulate an internal rating system and illustrates how this 
system works in practice. Finally, it concludes with the key measures that 
should be taken by banks, SMEs and public policy-makers to improve SME 
financing in the new rating culture. Some recommendations are also given 
in the course of the analysis, not only for SMEs to accommodate the new 
rating culture but also addressed to the competent authorities to ensure 
that the new rules do not jeopardise the SME sector and in turn the 
European economy.  
1.  An overview of the SME sector in Europe  
SMEs play a key role in the European economy: they are an essential source 
of jobs and they foster innovation and growth. Therefore, it is crucial to 
ensure that they have access to credit. Several financing sources are 
available to them, but banking credit has traditionally been and will 
c o n t i n u e  t o  b e  t h e  c h i e f  s o u r c e  o f  t h e i r  f u n d i n g .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  S M E s  
continue to suffer from a position of weakness when applying for a loan. 
1.1  A European definition of an SME 
In 1990, the European Commission began to develop an EU definition of 
SME. The demand for a harmonised definition was initiated by the 
Industry Council, to overcome the limitations of varying SME definitions THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND SME FINANCING | 3 
 
that had been used in the past. The Commission’s definition was released 
in May 2003 and took effect in January 2005. It is based on four criteria as 
outlined below (see also Table 1).  
1)  Staff headcounts or number of employees, which are established in 
annual work units (AWU). Anyone who worked full-time within the 
enterprise, or on its behalf, during the entire reference year counts as 
one unit. Part-time staff, seasonal workers and those who did not 
work the full year are treated as part-time staff, i.e. as fractions of one 
unit. The staff headcounts cover: 
•  employees;  
•  other persons working for the enterprise who are subordinate to it 
and considered to be employees under national law;  
•  owner-managers;  
•  partners who are engaged in a regular activity in the enterprise 
and who benefit from financial advantages arising from it. 
2)  Annual turnover, which is determined by calculating the income that 
the enterprise earned during the year in question from its sales and 
services after any rebates have been paid out. Turnover should not 
include value added taxes (VAT) or other indirect taxes. 
3)  Balance sheet total, along with reference to the value of the 
company’s assets. 
4)  Independence, which is another criterion to complement the 
definition of an independent (autonomous) or partner or linked 
micro, small- or medium-sized enterprise. This is defined in terms of 
capital and voting rights. An enterprise is considered to be 
independent when the influence of a single shareholder is limited. It 
is also considered independent if it has no participation in other 
enterprises and no enterprise has participation in it, or if the 
enterprise has a holding of less than 25% of the capital or voting 
rights in one or more other enterprises and/or outsiders do not have 
a stake of more than 25% of the capital or voting rights in it. This 
criterion permits calculations in the cases of independent, partner or 
linked enterprises and will ultimately determine whether or not the 
enterprise in question meets the various thresholds established in the 
SME definition.2 
                                                      
2 For more details, see European Commission (2005a).  4 | RYM AYADI 
 
Table 1. EU definition of an SME 
Category 
Staff 
headcounts 
(annual work 
units – AWU) 
Annual  
turnover 
Annual 
balance sheet 
total  
Independence 
Micro  <10   €2 million    €2 million 
Small   <50   €10 million   €10 million 
Medium-sized <250  €  50  million   €43 million 
Given by <25% of 
capital shares held 
by a third party 
Source: European Commission (2003c). 
An enterprise should compare its data with the thresholds introduced 
in the four criteria to enable it to identify itself among one of the three sub-
categories in the SME sector: micro, small or medium-sized.3 As Table 1 
shows, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises consist of those that 
employ fewer than 250 persons and have either an annual turnover not 
exceeding €50 million or an annual balance-sheet total not exceeding €43 
million.  
Under the established categories, medium-sized enterprises are 
defined as those that employ more than 50 but fewer than 250 persons, and 
whose annual turnover is more than €10 million but less than or equal to 
€50 million or whose annual balance-sheet total is more than €10 million 
but does not exceed €43 million. Small enterprises are defined as those that 
employ fewer than 50 persons and whose annual turnover or annual 
balance-sheet total does not exceed €10 million. Micro-enterprises are 
defined as those that employ fewer than 10 persons and whose annual 
turnover or annual balance-sheet total does not exceed €2 million.  
It is important to note that while it is compulsory to respect the staff 
headcount thresholds, an SME may choose to meet either the turnover or 
balance-sheet ceiling. It does not need to satisfy both and may exceed one 
of them without losing its status.  
                                                      
3 If the enterprise exceeds the headcounts or financial thresholds during the course 
of the reference year, its status will not be affected. The enterprise will retain the 
SME status with which it began that year. It will lose the status, however, if it goes 
above the thresholds over two consecutive accounting periods. Conversely, an 
enterprise could gain SME status if it was previously a large enterprise but falls 
below the thresholds for two consecutive accounting periods.    THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND SME FINANCING | 5 
 
1.2  The importance of the SME sector in Europe  
SMEs play a central role in employment in Europe. According to the 
Observatory of European SMEs4 (European Commission, 2002 and 2003), 
SMEs account for 99% of all companies and provide jobs for more than 90 
million persons in the EU-19,5 accounting for about two-thirds of total 
employment (Table 2). Among SMEs, the major share of jobs is in micro-
enterprises, which employ fewer than 10 employees. This trend has 
continued since 2000 (see Table 3).  
Nevertheless, the size of companies measured in terms of the average 
number of employees differs considerably among countries. Table 3 
provides an indication of the dominant size class of firms by country in the 
EU in 2003. The average company size seems to be very small, particularly 
in southern Mediterranean countries such as Greece and Italy. This reflects 
the large percentage of small family-owned firms in these countries. By 
contrast, Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands have the 
largest average number of employees per firm.  
Table 2. The role of SMEs in the EU-19 (2003) 
  SMEs  LSEs*  Total 
Number of enterprises (x 1,000)  19,270  40  19,310 
Employment (x 1,000)  97,420  42,300  139,710 
Persons employed by enterprise (on average)  5  1,052   
Turnover per enterprise (€ million)  0.9  319   
Value added per employee (per €1,000)  55  120   
Share of labour costs in value added (%)  56  47   
* Large-scale enterprises. 
Sources: Estimated by EIM Business and Policy Research, based on Eurostat’s SME database; 
also based on European Economy, Supplement A, May 2003 and Economic Outlook, 
No. 71, OECD, June 2003. 
                                                      
4 The European Commission’s Observatory of European SMEs regularly publishes 
information on SMEs across the EU-15, as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway 
and Switzerland. 
5 The EU-19 comprises the EU-15 plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and 
Switzerland.  6 | RYM AYADI 
 
Table 3. Size of enterprises in the EU-19 by country (2003) 
 
Enterprises 
(1000s) 
Average enterprise size 
(employed persons per 
enterprise) 
Size class 
dominance* 
Austria 270  11  Micro 
Belgium 440  7  Micro 
Denmark 210  10  SME 
Finland 220  7  LSE 
France 2,500  8  Micro 
Germany 3,020  10  LSE 
Greece 770  2  Micro 
Ireland 100  10  SME 
Italy 4,490  4  Micro 
Luxembourg 20  9  SME 
Netherlands 570  12  LSE 
Portugal 690  5  SME 
Spain 2,680  6  Micro 
Sweden 490  7  Micro 
UK 2,230  11  LSE 
EU-15 18,700  7  Micro 
Iceland 30  4  LSE 
Norway 240  7  SME 
Liechtenstein 4  6  Micro 
Switzerland 340  8  SME 
Non-EU 610  7  SME 
Total EU-19  19,310  7  Micro 
* A country or sector of industry is said to be micro, small, medium-sized or LSE-dominated 
if either micro, small and medium-sized (taken together) or large-scale enterprises have the 
largest share in total employment (in number).  
When comparing productivity and development of the workforce as 
well as the profitability of SMEs with large-scale enterprises (LSEs) over the 
period 1988-2001, SMEs showed satisfactory growth in productivity, 
contributed to an overall increase in employment and experienced a higher 
increase in average profitability than LSEs6 (Table 4). These data provide 
substantial evidence of the growth potential offered by SMEs to the 
European economy.  
                                                      
6 The data for 1988-2003 confirm the same trend (Observatory of European SMEs, 
2003-07).  THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND SME FINANCING | 7 
 
Yet major constraints continue to hinder their business performance 
and growth. According to the ENSR7 surveys conducted for the European 
Observatory of SMEs in 20028 among 7,669 SMEs in 19 European countries, 
the lack of skilled labour and poor access to finance are major problems. 
The same survey in 2003 showed that the paucity of customer purchasing 
power has also put the brake on SME business growth alongside the 
constraints listed in 2002. While the low level of customer purchasing 
power is a direct result of the unfavourable economic climate, the core 
issues of access to skilled labour and finance are persistent factors.  
Table 4. SMEs’ real value-added employment and profitability by country, EU-19 
in 1988-2001 (average annual change in %) 
  Real value added  Employment  Profitability 
 SMEs  LSEs  SMEs  LSEs  SMEs LSEs 
Austria 2.2  1.9  0  0.2  0.1 -0.1 
Belgium 1.9  2.2  0.2  0  0.1 0.4 
Denmark 2.6  2.8  0.1  0.2  0.6 0.7 
Finland -0.1  0.1  -1.7  -1.6  -1.3 -1.2 
France 1.3  2.4  0.3  0.7  -0.1 0.2 
Germany 2.5  3.2  0.3  -0.3  0.3 0.6 
Greece 3.3  2.3  2.1  1  -0.6 -3 
Ireland 7.7  9.5  2.8  3.1  2.1 0.9 
Italy 1.3  1.3  -0.3  -0.4  1.1 1.5 
Luxembourg 5.4  4.8  2.6  1.1  0 0.4 
Netherlands 2.1  2.5  1.1  0.9  0 0.3 
Portugal 3  3.3  0.2  0.4  2.6 0.7 
Spain 2.7  2.9  1.2  1.3  0.4 0.4 
Sweden 1.6  0.8  -1.2  -1.4  0.1 -0.9 
UK 2.4  2.3  -0.1  -0.9  0.2 0.2 
EU-15 2  2.5  0.3  -0.1  0.5 0.3 
Iceland 1.6  0  1.3  0.5  -0.6 2.7 
Norway 3.2  3.9  1.5  1.5  0.2 1.1 
Switzerland 1.6  1.7  0.4  0.1  0.5 2.1 
Non-EU 2.2  2.5  0.7  0.4  0.3 2 
Total 2.1  2.6  0.3  -0.1  0.5 0.3 
Sources: Estimated by EIM Business and Policy Research, based on Eurostat’s SME database; 
also based on European Economy, Supplement A, June 2001 and Economic Outlook, 
No. 65, OECD, June 2001. 
                                                      
7 ENSR refers to the European Network for SME Research.  
8 See European Commission (2002).  
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Table 5. Main activities* of SMEs by country in 2002 (in %) 
  AT BE DK  DE EL ES  FR FI IE IT  LU  NL  PT SE  UK  EU-19 
Manufacturing  12 9 14 9  4 10 9 13 9 15 4  8 14 11 10  11 
Construction  8  13 14 10  14 11 13 13 18 12 9  9  16 10 22  13 
Wholesale  trade 8  12  12 7 11 8 6 9 6 9  13  10 9 11 4  7 
Retail  trade  9  23 16 15  49 23 17 14 20 19 13 16 30  9  9  18 
Hotels  &  catering  16  11  2 5 6 8  11  1 1 6  13  6  10  1 2  6 
Repair  10  1 6 3  1 1 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 8 3  3 
Transport & 
communications 
5 4 6 4  5 9 4  12  6 5 5 6 3 6 6  6 
Financial  services  1 3 4 4  2 1 3 4 1 1 4 3    5 4  2 
Business  services 16 16 17 22  5  18 21 16 19 20 26 22 10 31 21  19 
Other services 
industries 
16  8  10 22  4  11 14 16 19 12 11 18  5  8  19  15 
Total  100 100 100 100  100 100 100 100 100 100 100  100 100 100 100  100 
* The NACE Rev. 1 nomenclature has been used for business sectors. 
Source: ENSR Enterprise Survey in 2002.  THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND SME FINANCING | 9 
 
In Europe, SMEs operate in a variety of sectors ranging from 
manufacturing, construction, retail trade and business services (accounting 
for the largest shares) to financial services (accounting for the smallest 
share). At country level, business services are particularly relevant in 
Sweden (more than 30% of SMEs) as well as in the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg and Germany (more than 20%). Retail trade is important for 
SMEs in Greece (about 50%), Portugal (30%) Belgium and Spain (more than 
20%) (see Table 5). 
1.3  Sources of SME financing  
Financing an SME generally depends on its sector of activity and its growth 
cycle.9 In order to grow, a firm needs to be able to rely on equity and debt. 
Thus SMEs have a financial growth cycle in which financial needs and 
options change as the business grows and becomes more transparent.  
Figure 1 shows this cycle in a stylised fashion, whereby firms lie on a 
size/age/information continuum. It seeks to give a general idea of which 
sources of finance become important at different stages in the financial 
growth cycle and the points in the cycle at which different types of funding 
are shown to begin and end.  
At the beginning of the growth cycle, the financing of smaller and 
younger firms is heavily dependent on initial insider finance (equity) and 
external investors through, for example, angel financing.10 (At this stage, 
these firms are an unknown quantity because they do not yet have a track 
record and therefore have much difficulty in accessing intermediated 
external finance.) Insider finance or equity is defined as funds provided by 
the start-up team, family or friends prior to and at the time of the firm’s 
inception. Angel financing is an informal, non-intermediated market for 
direct finance where ‘angels’, who are by definition high net-worth 
individuals, invest directly in small companies through an equity contract, 
typically common stock. Angels sometimes work as a small investment 
group in which they coordinate their investment activities.11 Sometimes 
this is done in conjunction with lawyers and accountants, who bring deal 
flair to the group and help structure the contracts. 
                                                      
9 See Berger & Udell (1998). 
10 See Sahlman (1990) and Wetzel (1994). 
11 See Prowse (1998). 10 | RYM AYADI 
 
Figure 1. Firm continuum and sources of finance 
 
Source: Berger & Udell (1998). 
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As firms grow, they gain access to intermediated finance on the 
equity side through venture capital, for example, and on the debt side 
through financial institutions and supplier credit. Venture capital (and 
trade credit) could typically come after the product or service has been 
successfully tested by the market and may be used to finance full-scale 
marketing and production. Eventually, if the firms survive and grow, they 
may access public equity and debt markets.  
Trade (or supplier) credit is the credit the supplier gives to his client 
in a business-to-business relationship. Instead of paying for the goods and 
services rapidly in cash, the firm makes delayed payments to its suppliers, 
which creates the equivalent of a loan from the suppliers to the firm. The 
use of supplier credit depends on the length of payment period, the 
availability of the supplier’s own funds and also access to bank loans.  
Suppliers are generally reluctant to grant trade credit to start-ups 
because of the lack of information about the firm and the higher probability 
of default. When companies grow and show stable cash-flows, trade credit 
becomes a viable and frequently used source of financing.  
As firms continue to grow and achieve a level of production whereby 
their balance sheets reflect substantial, tangible business assets that could 
be pledged as collaterals and guarantees, they can tap other sources to 
obtain debt financing. Commercial, cooperative and savings banks, 
specialised finance companies and other financial institutions together 
provide most of the external debt finance. 
Financial institutions provide two types of credit to SMEs: i) credit 
cards and credit lines,12 and ii) mortgage loans,13 equipment loans, motor 
vehicle loans, capital leases14 and other types of loans. The former are 
typically used to finance working capital needs and are often collateralised 
by assets unrelated to the use of the credit line. Indeed, they could be 
guaranteed by one or more insider owners, which gives the financial 
                                                      
12 The credit lines represent a loan commitment by the financial institution to 
provide future credit (these commitments may include short-term credit including 
overdrafts and long-term credit).  
13 Mortgages include both commercial and residential mortgages if the funds were 
used for business purposes. They may be secured by either commercial property or 
the personal property of the owner. 
14 For most equipment loans, motor vehicle loans and capital leases, the proceeds 
of the loan or lease are used to purchase the assets pledged as collateral. 12 | RYM AYADI 
 
institution the possibility of recourse to the personal wealth of the owners 
in the event the loan is not repaid. In many cases, the personal assets of the 
owners are explicitly pledged as collateral to back the loans (see Box 1). The 
latter are typically used to finance specific assets and are collateralised by 
the assets being financed (commonly known as ‘asset-based financing’) 
such as accounts receivable, inventory and equipment.  
Box 1. Differences between collaterals and guarantees 
Collaterals and guarantees are powerful tools that allow the financial 
institutions to offer credit on favourable terms (since the collateral itself reduces 
the risk of the loan) and also to proceed to recovery in the event that the 
borrower is defaulting on his or her payments. Indeed, providing collateral or a 
guarantee is not only a pledge against default for the financial institution, but it 
is also a tool to reduce the informational opacity of small businesses. The lack of 
information might result in credit rationing or the extension of credit only on 
relatively unfavourable terms.  
There are two types of collateral: the collateral that involves pledged 
assets owned by the firms (these may include accounts receivable and/or 
inventory, referred to as ‘asset-based lending’) and the collateral that involve 
pledging assets owned outside the firm, typically assets belonging to the firm’s 
owners. The monitoring of receivables and inventory may also produce valuable 
information about a firm’s future performance as well as information about the 
value of the collateral, which can be used as part of an overall relationship that 
may lead to more favourable credit terms in the future. 
Guarantees give the lender general recourse against the assets of the 
principle owner or other party issuing the guarantee. A guarantee is similar to a 
pledge of outside personal collateral, but it differs in two important ways. First, 
it is a broader claim than the pledge of personal collateral since the liability of 
the guarantor is not limited to any specific asset. Second, a guarantee is a weaker 
claim than a pledge of collateral, against any given set of assets since a guarantee 
does not involve specific terms that prevent these assets from being sold or 
consumed.  
Specialised finance companies also play a key role in providing debt 
financing to SMEs.  
Leasing involves a lease contract, i.e. an agreement between the 
owner of the asset, ‘the lessor’, and the user of the asset, the ‘lessee’, which 
conveys to the user the right to use the asset in return for a number of 
specified payments over the agreed period of time. Leasing is simply a way THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND SME FINANCING | 13 
 
of acquiring an asset without paying cash, taking out a loan or using other 
forms of financing. For many SMEs, leasing is attractive because it frees up 
cash that would otherwise be tied up in fixed assets and would not be 
available to finance working capital. Moreover, leasing companies usually 
do not require collateral. Hence, in an environment where access to capital 
may be difficult owing to a lack of financial visibility and collateral, leasing 
may provide a useful complement or substitute to traditional bank 
financing.  
Factoring involves the purchase (at a discount) of the accounts 
receivable15 of a firm by a third party (known as a ‘factor’). In the case of 
factoring, the underlying asset is sold to the factor, which means that in the 
event the borrower becomes insolvent, the underlying asset (the factored 
accounts receivable) is not part of the bankrupted estate. Obviously, in a 
factoring relationship, the credit is primarily based on the quality of the 
underlying accounts, not the quality of the borrower.  
Financial institutions and other finance intermediaries often put 
considerable weight on the financial conditions and reputations of the 
insider-owners and also on the relationship they have with them when 
making any investment decision. Generally, the creditworthiness of the 
enterprise or the entrepreneur is easily evaluated using modern credit-
coring techniques when a long credit history, pledgeable assets and 
personal data are available. 
1.4  Use and structure of SME financing in Europe 
A higher equity share within an SME could reduce the risk of an 
investment and provide a firm with wider access to external finance. 
According to the European Commission,16 among the different external 
financing sources, those most frequently used are overdrafts, bank loans, 
leasing and factoring. Other sources include external investors and 
subventions. Nevertheless, the majority of European SMEs depend strongly 
on bank financing (through bank loans and overdrafts).  
The availability of equity to SMEs varies among European countries 
and among the different firm sizes (Table 6). In some countries such as 
Germany, Italy and Austria, SMEs rely much less on their own capital, 
                                                      
15 That is, the sale payments due from customers.  
16 European Commission (2001). 14 | RYM AYADI 
 
while in France, Belgium, Spain and Portugal, the share of equity in the 
total balance sheet ranges between 39% and 42%. These differences can be 
attributed to differences in taxation, financial systems and legal 
frameworks (including the minimum equity requirements for some 
companies such as start-ups). History and culture play an important role, 
especially in the case of family ownership and reputation in some specific 
activities.  
Table 6. Share of equity in the total balance sheet by enterprise size (%) 
Size by turnover 
(millions) 
Austria  Belgium  France  Germany  Italy  Portugal  Spain 
Less than €7m   13  40  34  14  26  31  42 
Between €7m and €40m   27  38  35  22  25  40  43 
€40m and more  31  39  35  31  28  51  37 
All  sizes  28 39 35 30  27  42  38 
Source: European Commission (2001). 
In general, overdrafts offer short-term lending that can be used at 
very short notice (or without any notice period at all). Although they are 
more expensive than bank loans, they are often preferred by enterprises 
because of their higher flexibility.17 Banks typically charge 8-20% for 
overdrafts when there is an explicit agreement on the threshold. This rate 
could jump even higher when exceeding the agreed amount.   
Bank loans have longer maturity and their charges depend on the 
interest rates. The environment of low interest rates and inflation 
experienced over the past few years in the economic and monetary union 
(EMU) have brought down the rates for bank loans. This means that SMEs 
can obtain medium- and long-term bank loans at rates that vary between 5-
7% (which is 3-4% above the interbank rates).18 
In terms of banking relationships, in several member states such as 
Austria and Germany, enterprises have traditionally relied on a close 
relationship with one local bank (the Hausbank), which covers relatively 
small credit amounts (<€100,000) and is willing to lend even when business 
                                                      
17 European Commission (2001). 
18 In May 2005 the one-year interbank rates in the euro area (the Euribor-Euro 
Interbank Offered Rate) were at their lowest level (almost 2%) since the beginning 
of the 1990s.  THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND SME FINANCING | 15 
 
conditions are difficult. As shown by the ENSR survey19 (2002) (see Table 
7), 52% of the micro-enterprises rely on one bank, but one-third of the 
medium-sized enterprises also have a relationship with only one bank. At a 
country level, Denmark (with approximately 90%) and Norway (with 80%) 
show the highest percentages of SMEs having credit lines with only one 
bank. By contrast, in several southern European countries, SMEs tend to 
have credit lines with several banks. In Spain for example, only about one-
third of the SMEs have credit lines with one bank, which is similar to 
Greece (37%) and Italy (38%).  
Table 7. Percentage of SMEs with credit lines, by number of banks and size class in 
the EU-19 
Number of banks  < 10 employees  10-49 employees  50-249 employees 
Only one bank  52  39  33 
Two to three banks  38  42  31 
Four or more banks   6  11  22 
No answer  4  7  14 
Total* 100  100  100 
*The sum of each column is not always 100%, due to the rounding.  
Source: ENSR Enterprise Survey (2002). 
As for the amount of credit, almost 60% of the SMEs responding to 
this question in the ENSR survey have bank liabilities of up to €100,000, 
another 16% have bank liabilities between €100,000 and €500,000, about 3% 
have bank liabilities between €500,000 and €1 million, and only 1% have 
more than that. Finally, with regard to the maturity period of their loans, 
most of the SMEs’ largest bank loans have a maturity period of over three 
years. As Table 8 shows, the focus on short-term financing is most 
pronounced in the wholesale sector, whereas loans of five years and more 
are frequently used in the personal services sector.  
With respect to alternative financing sources to bank loans, the use of 
leasing seems to be increasing in Europe. It is most often used to acquire 
goods with a substantial second-hand value (such as cars, real estate, 
machinery, etc.). The main disadvantage of leasing is that the ‘effective’ 
interest rate is usually higher compared with bank loans. Still, leasing is an 
interesting source of funding especially for SMEs and enterprises that have 
low revenues but high growth opportunities. In the EU, leasing rose in 2001 
                                                      
19 European Commission (2003). 16 | RYM AYADI 
 
by about 8.5% compared with 2000 – in real terms, this equates to €193 
billion.20 In many countries, leasing seems to be used particularly by fast-
growing SMEs (especially those in Belgium, Finland, Ireland and Spain).  
Table 8. Maturity period for the largest SME bank loans and sector in the EU-19 
(%) 
  Manu. Const.  Whole-
sale 
Retail  Trans-
port & 
comm. 
Bus. 
Service 
Pers. 
Service  
Total  
< than 6 months   7  7  18  9  5  9  6 8 
6 months-1 year  9  7  7  8  8  5  5 7 
1-3 years  14  22  14  14  18  17  18 17 
3-5 years  26  26  18  23  26  18  16 21 
5 years or longer  21  24  22  26  29  28  43 27 
No answer  24  15  21  21  14  22  22 20 
Total 100  100  100  100  100  100  100 100 
Source: ENSR Enterprise Survey (2002). 
According to the Observatory of European SMEs (European 
Commission, 2003), incorporating findings from the Exco Grant & 
Thornton Survey of European SMEs (2001),21 about 11% of SMEs in Europe 
use  factoring, but considerable differences can still be observed across 
countries. Whereas it is estimated that 32% of SMEs in France use factoring, 
it is hardly ever used in Sweden (only 3%).22 Factoring is considered to be 
more suitable for small enterprises and on average 50% of the total number 
of European factoring companies’ clients have an annual turnover of less 
than €2 million, with 91% having less than €15 million.23 Despite the fact 
that it has been used for nearly 40 years, the average penetration rate of 
factoring is relatively low (only 11%). The low penetration rate of factoring 
can be readily confirmed when looking at the World Bank’s World Factoring 
Yearbook – 2003.24 When measuring the relative importance of factoring to 
GDP, the factoring rate did not reach 5.4% in Europe25 in 2002.  
                                                      
20 See Leaseurope (2002).  
21 The survey was based on 4,400 replies from a sample of 42,400 enterprises.  
22 See the European Business Survey by Grant Thornton (2001).  
23 Greater London Enterprise Ltd., Analysis of Use of Factoring, Brussels (2003).  
24 See World Bank (2004). 
25 This includes the EU-25 plus Iceland, Norway, Russia, Switzerland and Turkey.  THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND SME FINANCING | 17 
 
Finally, the use of trade credit has been growing among European 
SMEs (see Table 9). In a survey26 conducted by Intrum Justitia (2005), trade 
credit was ranked as the primary financing source above bank and other 
debt financing. Indeed, for a considerable number of SMEs, trade credit is a 
more important source of working capital than bank loans.  
Table 9. Amounts owed to trade creditors due and payable within one year, 2000 
(percentage of total capital)  
 Manufacturingb Retail  tradec Transportation/Communicationd 
Firm size  Small  Medium  Small  Medium  Small   Medium  
Austria 12.01a 8.53  21.17a 15.36  16.12a 9.49 
Belgium 17.18  20.98  21.11  28.84  17.55  22.97 
France 25.55  25.88  28.70  32.5  24.78  19.23 
Finland 7.36  3.92  20.47  13.4  11.12  5.72 
Germany 13.23 10.80  24.21 19.01  na  na 
Italy 23.94  26.46  31.82  39.99 13.89  21.76 
Netherlands na  8.37 na  7.75 na  7.3 
Portugal 16.05  15.56  27.73  26.78  10.61  3.5 
Spain 21.04  19.33  27.35  26.33  11.17  5.24 
Sweden   10.84  16.93  18.01  22.24  10.68  11.67 
a Data refers to 1999.  
b Manufacturing refers to the following sectors of NACE Rev. 1: 13-22 and 24-36. 
c Retail trade refers to the following sectors of NACE Rev. 1: 52.1-52.6 + 50.5. 
d Transportation and communications refers to the following sectors of NACE Rev. 1: 60-64. 
Notes: “Small” refers to enterprises with an annual turnover of less than €7 million; 
“medium” refers to enterprises with an annual turnover of between €7 million and 
€40 million.  
Source: BACH Database, August 2003. 
Trade credit is easily accessible even under conditions of slow growth 
or recession when banks become more reluctant to lend. The charges 
involved in this form of financing include the financing cost and a risk 
premium. Frequently, a cash discount for immediate payment is offered by 
the supplier, which if not used by the client constitutes an additional cost. 
Further, many SMEs are not able to pay their suppliers on time before they 
are paid by their customers owing to liquidity constraints. The same survey 
confirmed that a large proportion of companies are forced to pay invoices 
later because they are not able to generate sufficient cash-flow.  
                                                      
26 The survey was conducted in 23 European countries in February 2005. More than 
6,500 companies took part in the survey.  18 | RYM AYADI 
 
Not surprisingly, the amounts owed to trade creditors are larger in 
countries with longer payment periods27 (Table 10). The effective payment 
periods differ by country: for example, in 2002, it took on average 87 days 
before payment was made in Italy (corresponding to a delay of 21 days), 
whereas in Sweden, firms collect their debts within an average of 34 days 
(corresponding to a delay of only 8 days). This trend is confirmed by the 
Intrum Justitia survey (2005), which revealed that invoices in the Nordic 
countries are generally paid with a delay of one week with respect to the 
agreed terms, while in southern countries such as Italy and Spain, delays 
average between two and three weeks – with the notable exception of 
Portugal, where payments are made up to five weeks after the due date. 
The same survey in 2005 showed an overall increase of the average 
payment duration to 57.4 days in 2004 as compared with 56.2 days in 2003. 
Table 10. Payment behaviour in Europe in 2001-02 (in days)  
  Payment target  Payment delay  Total 
 2001 2002  2001  2002  2001  2002 2004* 
Italy 64 66  24  21  88  87 91.7 
Belgium 41 39  20  22  61  61 58.7 
France   45  46  12  10  57  56 58.7 
UK   29  31  28  23  57  54 51.4 
Netherlands 26 26  21  20  47  46 58.7 
Germany   23  23  18  17  41  40 41.1 
Austria 25 27  13  10  38  37 41.1 
Switzerland   24  22  16  14  40  36 41.1 
Sweden 24 26  8  8  33  34 31.8 
* Data for 2004 from Intrum Justitia (2005). 
Source: Creditreform (2003). 
Comparing the composition of external financing resources among 
European countries, no single pattern emerges (Table 11). In Spain, France, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal, leasing is used more often 
than overdrafts, while factoring seems to be especially important in France. 
In other countries such as Denmark, Italy, Ireland and Sweden, enterprises 
                                                      
27 The payment period is part of the contract between the supplier and client. The 
difference between the contractual or target payment period and the effective 
period is the payment delay (late payments). In other words, suppliers offer their 
customers a payment delay but the latter do not always pay on time; therefore they 
automatically obtain extra credit.  THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND SME FINANCING | 19 
 
have a particular preference for using overdrafts to finance their 
businesses.  
Table 11. SMEs’ use of external financing in the EU by type (%) 
 Overdrafts  Leasing 
External 
investors 
Factoring  Bank loans  Subventions 
Belgium 37  25  12  4  56 14 
Denmark 73  25  13  7  24 7 
Germany 47  43  5  2  66 7 
Greece 23  15  10  8  68 12 
Spain 8  48  15  15  58 10 
France   36  47  7  32  63 11 
Ireland 70  48  19  14  39 10 
Italy 78  41  7  17  17 10 
Luxembourg 22  33  15  11  44 15 
Netherlands 17  31  11  3  50 9 
Austria 42  39  1  6  65 8 
Portugal 16  47  7  10  48 6 
Finland 46  27  15  14  64 11 
Sweden 70  29  10  3  27 6 
UK 59  42  11  7  34 10 
Total EU-15  50  39  9  11  46 9 
Source: Exco, Grant & Thornton survey of SMEs (2001). 
Overall, according to the Exco, Grant & Thornton survey of SMEs 
(2001), 46% of European SMEs rely on bank loans, 50% use overdrafts, 39% 
use leasing and some 11% use factoring. Hence, the strong reliance on loan 
finance implies an equally strong need for collateral to secure access to 
loans for healthy businesses. 
1.5  The main constraints to SME financing by banks 
Traditionally, SMEs seem to have suffered problems when looking for 
external financing. For them the cost of borrowing (interest rates and 
charges) is an important issue. Despite the steady decline of interest rates in 
the euro area during the past few years, external finance tends to be more 
expensive for smaller firms than for large ones, as the fixed costs of lending 
(administrative costs, the cost of collecting information and the risk 
premium) are not proportional to the size of the loan. 28  
                                                      
28 See Wagenvoort (2003c). 20 | RYM AYADI 
 
According to the 2002 ENSR survey, 36% of the respondents were 
dissatisfied with their banks because they considered the interest rates to be 
too high, 51% of them thought that bank charges were far too high and 59% 
were dissatisfied with their bank’s services.29  
Some experts30 attribute the high lending costs to a lack of 
competition among lenders in certain regions, which enables them to 
charge interest rates that are in excess of what the underlying credit risk 
requires. Small businesses are usually dependent on small local banks, 
because of their local knowledge and experience, which in turn strengthens 
the bank-firm relationship and contributes to reducing information 
asymmetry; but on the other hand, this tends to create market power, 
allowing a possible extraction of the surplus from SMEs. 
To illustrate the financing constraints facing SMEs, the results of a 
survey undertaken by the European Observatory of SMEs (European 
Commission, 2003)31 indicate that about 30% of firms with fewer than 50 
employees felt that access to finance was the major constraint to the 
development of their business (Figure 2).  
In terms of the business growth cycle, there are also variations among 
companies at different points in their development as to how much bank 
credit is perceived as the main obstacle to their growth (see Table 12). 
The availability of bank financing is also contingent on the growth 
rate of bank lending in relation to the overall business cycle and also to the 
bank’s lending approach.  
 
                                                      
29 Efforts have been undertaken, however, by some countries such as Ireland to 
improve the bank-client relationship. Indeed, the enterprise support unit of the 
Bank of Ireland introduced a relationship-management approach to the benefit of 
both the bank and their clients. This approach is complemented by a range of 
financial and advisory services geared to the particular circumstances of start-ups 
and developing enterprises, and also includes ‘first-step’ loans, which are interest-
free for a three-year period (European Commission, 2003). 
30 See Berger et al. (1998) for evidence in the US and Schure, Wagenvoort and 
O’Brien (2004) for evidence in Europe.  
31 The survey covered 7,600 SMEs in 19 European countries (see also European 
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Figure 2. Share of firms that consider access to finance to be the major business 
constraint, by size (%) 
 
Table 12. Main financial obstacles to growth at the different development stages of  
companies (%) 
Company 
obstacles  
Early stage  Limited 
growth 
Very 
innovative 
Strong 
growth 
Financing as the 
main obstacle 
22 8  16  19 
Bank credit   40  40  47  50 
Bank guarantees   33  37  44  48 
Personal 
guarantees  
25 26  36  39 
Guarantees on 
fixed assets  
4 5  5  7 
Source: European Commission (2003). 
In the past few years, the growth rate of bank lending has slowed – 
reflecting the weak economic cycle and lower demand as well as more 
selective lending – to the extent that SMEs have feared a potential ‘credit 
crunch’. This trend was not, however, indicative of banks refusing to grant 
credit to SMEs, but rather evidence of a more cautious lending approach as 
banks sought higher profitability and to meet greater risk-management 
requirements. On the contrary, the EIB survey (2003) of some 70 European 
banks showed an increase of credit volumes to consumers and businesses 
during the period 2000-02. Similarly, another survey conducted by 
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McKinsey & Company for the European Commission (2005c) (hereafter 
referred to as ‘the McKinsey & Co. survey’) shows that banks view the SME 
credit business as a core element of their portfolio and want to increase 
their growth in this sector.32  
Looking at the reasons that impede lending to small and medium-
sized firms (Figure 3), those banks interviewed by the EIB survey identified 
four obstacles ranked by their level of relevance:  
1)  lack of equity in the client’s firm,  
2)  high credit risk, 
3)  availability of adequate collateral and  
4)  poor information on the client’s firm.  
As shown in Figure 3, there are striking differences among the 
obstacles identified in relation to the development of bank lending to firms 
of varying sizes. For example, the lack of equity, company risk and 
available collateral are the main problems for SME financing, whereas low 
expected profitability is the main brake on financing for large firms. Each of 
these issues is examined below. 
 
Figure 3. Main obstacles to the development of bank lending to firms 
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32 This survey was conducted with a sample of 44 large and 1,000 medium-sized 
European banks, in which 33 large and 71 small and medium-sized banks 
responded. The participating banks cover 39% of European banking assets. For 
more details, see European Commission (2005b). THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND SME FINANCING | 23 
 
Lack of equity. As discussed in the previous section, the average rate 
of equity financing is usually low in Europe, owing to the long-anchored 
loan financing tradition. The availability of equity in SMEs varies among 
countries and depends on the SME’s size. As previously noted in Table 6, 
equity shares vary between 13% and 51% in Europe. In France, Belgium 
and Portugal, for example, equity financing is more prevalent but still it 
represents one-third of the total balance sheet. This variation is primarily a 
result of heterogeneous tax laws among the member states, which may be 
more favourable in some countries such as Belgium33 and less favourable in 
others such as Germany.  
High credit risk. When launching a new business or an innovative 
project, the entrepreneur is normally better informed about the project risks 
than those financing it. This may prevent lenders from observing the real 
nature of the borrower or influencing the borrower’s strategic behaviour 
after the credit is released. As a result, the lender could voluntarily raise the 
risk premium on loans (see Annex 1) to properly manage its risks,34 which 
translates into higher interest rates for borrowers. This situation may 
trigger an adverse-selection effect that encourages riskier behaviour owing 
to the moral hazard principle, which in turn enhances the probability of 
default and may encourage credit rationing. Indeed, the borrower may 
s u f f e r  f r o m  c r e d i t  r a t i o n i n g  a s  t h e y  m a y  n o t  b e  a b l e  t o  o b t a i n  a s  m u c h  
credit as they want even though they are willing to pay the interest rate set 
by their lenders or meet extra conditions to ensure their solvability.35  
In view of the upcoming regulatory changes for European banks 
(Basel II and the CRD), the proper management of credit risk will be even 
more important than it is today. Hence, banks will rely on more 
sophisticated risk-management techniques and extensive information on 
                                                      
33 It is commonly known that tax regimes in the UK and Ireland are more 
favourable to the establishment of SMEs, but no data on the average rate of equity 
financing were available.  
34 Governments in many countries are aware of the negative effect that credit 
rationing has on SME growth and have undertaken initiatives to address the 
perceived funding gap in their national economies. These include investing in 
loans and equity guarantee schemes, venture capital trusts, grants, equity 
investments and other programmes. 
35 The theoretical literature on credit rationing as a result of asymmetric 
information was initiated by Stiglitz & Weiss (1981). 24 | RYM AYADI 
 
the borrower to derive the probabilities of default and other risk 
parameters.  
Availability of adequate collateral.  A bank is inclined to ask for 
collateral to reduce the loan loss in the event of default. For an SME, 
however, providing collateral is not always an easy task,36 especially the 
type that protects the lender for the amount of risk taken.37 This situation 
may explain why 23% (and 34%) of those SMEs employing between 0-9 
employees and between 10-49 employees respectively are not able to access 
bank loans according to the ENSR survey (2002).  
Informational opacity. Small firms are considered to be more 
vulnerable than larger ones as they face less rigorous reporting 
requirements owing to their age and their short credit history. Indeed, 
unlike larger firms, small firms do not enter into contracts that are publicly 
visible and widely reported in the press – contracts with their labour force, 
their suppliers and their customers are generally kept private. In addition, 
small businesses do not issue traded securities that are continuously priced 
in public markets. Nor do they have audited financial statements that can 
be shared with any provider of outside finance. Some family-owned 
businesses, for example, are very reluctant to report strategic (sometimes 
considered to be confidential) information such as business structure, 
growth opportunities, strategic orientation and even ownership structure. 
As a result, small firms are often unable to convey their status in a credible 
way, and have more difficulty building a reputation to signal their high 
quality as a borrower. The inherent characteristics (and weaknesses) of 
SMEs in terms of size and limited access to capital markets feed their 
informational opacity, which may prevent easy access to sources of finance 
and in some cases makes financial contracting problematic. 
                                                      
36 It is necessary to define what kinds of assets are acceptable collateral from the 
bank’s point of view. The most common form of collateral is real estate (either 
owned by the business or privately owned by the entrepreneur). It may also 
happen that SMEs assign private or personal savings books to banks as collateral. 
Other assets such as accounts receivable, inventories or fixed assets could serve as 
collateral if they fulfil specific conditions.   
37 SMEs generally lack sufficient collateral. Yet even if collateral is available, an 
economic slowdown may have a negative effect on its value (European 
Commission, 2001). THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND SME FINANCING | 25 
 
According to the Observatory of European SMEs (European 
Commission, 2003), the availability of information is a basic condition for 
granting loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises. But the evidence 
shows that banks only receive balance sheets and the profit and loss 
accounts from about two-thirds of their SME clients. More sophisticated 
documents such as budgets for the next few years, financial plans, cash-
flow forecasts, information on inventories, unpaid invoices or qualitative 
information are seldom provided. Generally, the provision of all the 
information required is a perquisite to extend a loan or an overdraft.  
Yet some improvements in the information flow have been observed 
in comparison with a few years ago. SMEs are becoming more proactive 
and they more readily deliver their financial statements and inform their 
banks about major developments in their businesses. Nevertheless, the 
information provided by SMEs is less sophisticated and less well-
structured or validated as compared with the information provided by 
large enterprises. Small firms usually have small accounting departments 
or none at all. The entrepreneurs themselves may lack financial 
administrative skills or are so involved in day-to-day business matters that 
the documents required by the bank are often neglected. Entrepreneurs 
should overcome these weaknesses before the implementation of the new 
CRD in Europe. Indeed, providing balance sheets and profit and loss 
accounts will be a standard requirement for all enterprises in Europe in 
order to have access to banking finance.  
To explore the list of obstacles to SMEs financing, we conducted 
direct interviews with banking experts. According to them, the four factors 
mentioned above are not the only factors that impede the granting of loans. 
Poor business performance, a lack of entrepreneurial skills and uncertain 
development prospects are shown to be equally important. The first of 
these – poor business performance – can be indicated by a low equity ratio, 
insufficient cash-flow and liquidity problems. The latter two problems can 
be exacerbated by late payments as well as by bad credit management.  
If some of these obstacles are assessed as being prevalent, many 
banks are not willing to provide or extend a credit line, even if the SME can 
offer enough collateral. For some existing clients, the reduction of current 
credit facilities is more likely to happen than a complete withdrawal of all 
facilities extended to the firm. This reduction is essentially a consequence of 
the bank’s assessment of the risk profile of the firm. The extension of 26 | RYM AYADI 
 
existing credit lines to SMEs might become more difficult as a result of the 
more stringent regulatory conditions of the new capital requirement rules.  
Based on the analysis above, it can be concluded that although 
alternative financing sources such as leasing, factoring and trade credit 
exist, SMEs rely heavily on bank financing. But bank financing requires a 
large volume of financial and strategic information that ought to be 
provided by SMEs to reduce the information gap between the borrower 
and its lender. In the face of the new requirements of Basel II globally and 
the new CRD in the EU, banks will have to reconsider their traditional 
approaches. Further, the new rules introduce stricter requirements to 
counter growing concerns about risks at the European and global levels. 
SMEs need to understand these regulatory changes as they will have some 
impact on their financing conditions, not necessarily by reducing their 
credit facilities but by rendering the whole process more risk-sensitive and 
dependent on the individual quality of the borrowers. 
The next section addresses capital regulation in more detail, with an 
in-depth discussion of Basel II and the CRD. 
2.  The Basel Capital Accord, the CRD and SME financing  
Many questions arise when speaking about capital regulation: What is 
capital? Why do banks need to hold capital to conduct their business? What 
is the role of capital in banking? How much capital are banks required to 
hold? And how do capital requirements for banks impact SME financing 
conditions?  
2.1  Why are banks required to hold regulatory capital? 
History has shown the grim reality of a banking industry tainted with 
worldwide failures and fiascos38 arising from errors of risk management. 
Thus, the objective of capital regulation has always been very simple: to 
reduce the number of bank failures. Sufficient capital must therefore be 
                                                      
38 For example, not too long ago (in 1995), the UK’s oldest merchant bank, Barings, 
also known as the ‘Queen’s bank’, went bankrupt as a result of the embezzling 
actions of a single trader based at a small office in Singapore and the incapacity of 
the risk-management team to avoid the worst consequences. This story is one 
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maintained to provide a cushion to absorb losses that would otherwise 
cause the failure of a bank (see Box 2).  
Box 2. What is capital in a regulatory context? 
In the regulatory context, capital is defined on a two-tiered basis:  
•  Tier 1 capital (or core capital) includes stock issues (shareholders’ equity) 
and disclosed reserves. Disclosed reserves can be in the form of loan-loss 
reserves set aside to cushion future losses and smooth out income volatility. 
•  Tier 2 capital (or supplementary capital) includes perpetual securities, 
unrealised gains on investment securities, hybrid capital instruments (e.g. 
mandatory convertibles), long-term subordinated debt with maturity greater 
than five years and hidden reserves, such as an excess allowance for losses 
on loans and leases. The total of tier 2 capital is limited to a maximum of 
100% of the total of tier 1 capital. 
The 1995 proposal of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision also 
provided for a third tier of capital consisting of short-term unsecured 
subordinated debts that can only be used for meeting market-risk capital 
requirements. 
Source: BIS (1988). 
Among the risks that a bank must manage, credit risk is 
fundamentally the most important, particularly when a bank mostly 
focuses on retail and corporate activities, including lending to small- and 
medium-sized enterprises. Credit risk is the risk of loss due to the failure of 
the counterparties to meet their obligations as stated in a loan contract.  
A bank must also manage other types of risks, such as market risk 
when it manages securities and bonds in its balance sheet, and operational 
risk when it relies heavily on information technology and human resources. 
By definition, market risk is the risk of loss owing to a change in market 
prices, such as equity prices, interest or exchange rates. Operational risk is 
the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, 
persons or systems, or from external events.  
As a consequence, a bank that manages these risks is required to hold 
capital, referred to as capital requirements or the capital adequacy ratio, to 
limit its leverage and provide a buffer against unexpected losses. The 
retention of sufficient capital decreases the likelihood of a bank becoming 
insolvent and reduces the negative impact of bank failure through its loss 
absorption and increased public confidence. Nevertheless, high capital 28 | RYM AYADI 
 
adequacy ratios do not guarantee the bank’s soundness, particularly if the 
risks being taken are high or the bank is mismanaged. Therefore, 
supervisors consider a bank’s capital adequacy in the context of a broader 
set of factors. But the bottom line is that capital is an important indicator of 
a bank’s general condition and a signal to capital markets, and minimum 
capital requirements are one of the essential supervisory instruments. In 
many cases, higher capital requirements could prove necessary for bank 
loans to higher risk clients – in times of recession, for example, the 
management of credit risk for these types of loans may turn out to be 
difficult and undoubtedly the primary source of banks’ losses.  
2.2  Basel I and its shortcomings 
The Basel Capital Accord (Basel I) – the current international 
framework on capital adequacy – was adopted in 1988 by a group of 
central banks and other national supervisory authorities working within 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS).39 The 1988 Accord40 
set out details for measuring capital adequacy and the minimum standards 
for implementation into the national laws of the G-13 member countries by 
December 1992.  
The Basel I Accord has two fundamental objectives, namely: 
•  to “strengthen the soundness and the stability of the international 
banking system”41 by creating common minimum capital adequacy 
requirements for internationally active banks to set aside a capital 
cushion for the amount of risk taken; and 
                                                      
39 The BCBS was created in 1975 within the Bank of International Settlements in 
Basel. The Committee brought together bank supervisors from the G-13 countries 
(Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US) to respond to the myriad of bank 
failures that undermined financial stability in the 1970s. It has no formal authority; 
rather, its objective is to develop broad supervisory standards and promote best 
practices, in the expectation that each country will implement the standards in the 
ways most appropriate to its circumstances. Agreements are developed by 
consensus, but decisions about which parts of the agreements to implement and 
how to do so are left to each nation’s regulatory authorities.    
40 See BIS (1988). 
41 Ibid. THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND SME FINANCING | 29 
 
•  to create a level playing field among international banks by 
establishing that the framework should be fair and consistent in its 
application to banks in different countries.  
The original framework assessed capital mainly in relation to credit 
risk and addressed other risks (such as market risk, liquidity risk and 
operational risk) only implicitly – it effectively loaded all regulatory capital 
requirements into measures of credit risk.  
Specifically, the 1988 capital framework requires banks to hold capital 
known as ‘regulatory capital’ through the combination of equity, loan-loss 
reserves, subordinated debts and some other instruments, equal to at least 
8% of all the risk-weighted assets (RWA) (such as loans and securities) and 
asset-equivalent off-balance-sheet exposures (such as loan commitments, 
standby letters of credit and obligations on derivatives contracts) in their 
portfolios.42 This defines a common measure of solvency known as the 
‘Cooke Ratio’ (see Box 3).  
The assignment of risk weights is based on the perceived credit 
quality of an individual obligor and each off-balance-sheet exposure is 
converted to its equivalent amount of asset and then weighted accordingly.  
Four broad categories of capital charges are set by the Basel I Accord:  
•  government exposures with OECD countries receive 0% credit-risk 
capital charges;  
•  OECD banks and non-OECD governments receive a 1.6% capital 
charge (which corresponds to a risk weight of 20%);  
•  mortgages receive a 4% capital charge (which corresponds to a risk 
weight of 50%); and 
•  other remaining exposures such as those to other banks and all 
corporations including SMEs receive a capital charge of 8% (which 
corresponds to a risk weight of 100%). More recently, the 1996 
amendment43 to the Basel Capital Accord extended the initial 
                                                      
42 In addition to on-balance-sheet activities, the Basel framework takes into account 
the credit risk of off-balance-sheet items by applying credit conversion factors to 
the different types of off-balance-sheet assets, so that they can then be treated as 
on-balance-sheet items.  
43 Amendment of the Capital Accord to incorporate market risks, BCBS, January 
1996 (BIS, 1996). 30 | RYM AYADI 
 
requirement to include risk-based capital adequacy for market risk in 
the trading books of the banks.  
Box 3. How to calculate minimum capital requirements according to the 1988 
Basel Capital Accord 
Capital adequacy for on-balance-sheet exposures, as measured by the two-tiered 
capital regime, will result in a risk-weighted ratio in which the bank’s total 
capital requirements are related to the different categories of on-balance-sheet 
exposures weighted to the four risk categories displayed in Table B.3.1. 
Table B.3.1. Risk weights of on-balance-sheet assets 
Risk weights (%)  Asset category 
0  Cash and gold held in the bank, obligations on OECD 
governments and US treasuries  
20  Claims on OECD banks, securities issued by US 
government agencies, claims on municipalities  
50  Residential mortgages  
100  All other claims: corporate bonds, less-developed countries’ 
debt, claims on non-OECD banks, equity, real estate, plant 
and equipment, mortgage strips and residuals  
 
The aggregate euro amount in each risk category is then multiplied by the risk 
weight assigned to that category. The resulting weighted values from each of the 
risk categories are then added together. The sum is the bank’s total risk-
weighted assets, which forms the denominator of the Cooke Ratio. Finally, the 
required capital for the bank must be equal to at least 8% of the total risk-
weighted assets in the bank’s portfolio. For example: 
An unsecured loan of €100 to a non-bank entity requires a risk weight of 100% 
(Table B.3.1). The risk-weighted asset is therefore: 
RWA = €100*100% = €100 
A minimum of 8% capital requirement results in 8%*RWA= 8%*€100=€8. 
Source: BIS (1988). 
 
Basel I has served its purpose of promoting financial stability and 
providing an equitable basis for competition among internationally active 
banks since its inception in 1988. Undoubtedly, throughout the numerous 
turbulent market events during the past decade (i.e. bank failures such the 
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these banks by strengthening the capital base of the international financial 
system. Nevertheless, in spite of its success, Basel I was seen to suffer from 
many shortcomings. Its inadequacy was mainly triggered by major 
innovations in the banking industry and advances in risk-management 
techniques, as discussed below. 
The first limitation of Basel I is related to the overly simplified approach 
inherent to its architecture. Indeed, as previously explained, the use of only 
four broad credit risk-weighting categories for capital charges does not 
provide enough granularity in the measurement or distinction of different 
levels of credit risk embedded in banking portfolios, especially to address 
the activities of the most complex organisations. This limited differentiation 
among degrees of risks means that calculated capital ratios are often 
uninformative and may provide misleading information about a bank’s 
capital adequacy relative to its real risks. As an example, suppose ‘bank A’ 
has a portfolio of different quality borrowers. This bank is required to hold 
8% of capital adequacy on its overall portfolio irregardless of the quality of 
its borrowers, which in turn means that a better quality or investment 
grade borrower is not rewarded by its bank (with better terms in its loan 
policy, better rates and more access to loan financing). 
Second, the most obvious limitation, which is a result of the limited 
differentiation among degrees of risks, is the creation of incentives for 
banks to engage in ‘gaming’ through regulatory arbitrage provided by 
asset securitisation and some other innovative financial vehicles including 
credit derivatives. The general idea behind these new instruments is to 
allow banks to trade their credit risk exposures in order to transfer the risk 
to other financial actors in the market. In other words, thanks to these new 
instruments, banks tend to trade exposures for whatever regulatory capital 
requirement is higher than what the market requires. As an example, 
residential mortgages are types of assets that banks securitise in large 
volume because they believe the required regulatory capital to be greater 
than market or economic capital (see Box 4). As a consequence, asset 
securitisation has rendered the 1988 Accord’s minimum capital 
requirements ineffective as a tool to hold capital against the real risk taken. 
Through asset securitisation, banks have been able to significantly lower 
their credit risk-based capital requirements without reducing the actual 
credit risk embedded in their banking portfolios.  
Third, a one-size-fits-all approach to risk management is not adequate for 
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requirements, nor does it provide them with enough incentives to improve 
risk-management techniques. Moreover, the 1988 Accord gives very little 
attention to credit-risk mitigation. Despite the rapid expansion of credit 
derivatives as a risk-management tool during the past decade, the current 
Accord does not recognise offsets on the banking book through credit-risk 
mitigation techniques covering collateral, guarantees,44 credit derivatives 
and on-balance-sheet netting.  
Finally, with the exception of the 1996 amendment to extend capital 
adequacy to market risk, the 1988 Accord focused primarily on credit-risk 
capital requirements and did not keep pace with banking industry 
developments. Indeed, over the past 15 years, banks have extensively used 
the technological advances in information technology to improve their risk-
management techniques and functions that cover a far more 
comprehensive range of risks outside credit and market risks.  
 
Box 4. What is economic capital? 
Economic capital is a bank’s own estimates of the capital needed to support its 
risk-taking activities. It represents the emerging best practice for measuring and 
reporting all kinds of risk across a financial organisation. It is called ‘economic’ 
because it measures risk in terms of economic realities. It is called ‘capital’ because 
part of the measurement process involves converting a risk distribution to the 
amount of capital that is required to support the risk, in line with the institution’s 
target financial strength (e.g. credit rating). 
An economic capital framework allows banking institutions to drive a return 
on equity discipline into individual transaction decisions through risk-based 
pricing. Risk-based pricing can be a key competitive differentiator. Indeed, the 
banks that use risk-based pricing are able to ‘cherry pick’ the most profitable loans 
through aggressive pricing; those not using this technique will accumulate a 
disproportionate share of under-priced and higher-risk loans.  
Leading global banks that have embraced the economic capital framework 
include: ABN Amro, Deutsche Bank, Bank of Ireland, Barclays, SE Banken and 
ING.  
 
                                                      
44 According to a survey of industry views undertaken by the capital group of the 
BCBS in January 2000, collateral and guarantees are the most widely used credit-
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2.3  Basel II: A new era of risk management  
Since 1998, the BCBS has been engaged in a revision process of the 1988 
Capital Accord: in 2001, it published the second consultation paper (CP2); 
in 2003, the third consultation paper (CP3) improved the previous version 
of the Accord; and in June 2004, the new Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) was 
formally released.  
The application of the new Accord will be gradual from year-end 
2006 until year-end 2007. The Committee explicitly stated that the 
standardised and the IRB approaches for credit risk and the basic and 
standardised approaches for operational risk remain scheduled for the end 
of 2006. The advanced IRB approach for credit risk and the advanced 
measurement approach for operational risk will be deferred until the end of 
2007 in order to provide additional time for supervisors and the industry to 
develop a consistent and reliable method of implementation. 
The new Basel Capital Accord introduces an evolutionary and 
flexible approach to banking supervision, which reflects the rapid progress 
and sophistication of banking practices and risk-management techniques. 
By aligning regulation and supervision with these techniques, the new 
capital framework not only provides strong incentives for banks to 
continue improving their internal risk-management capabilities but also 
gives the necessary tools to supervisors to enable them to react to any 
emerging matter that occurs and thus reduces the regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities that the existing rules create.  
Indeed, Basel II introduces a number of new aspects to the regulation 
and supervision of banks, structured around three mutually reinforcing 
pillars:  
•  pillar 1: minimum capital requirements, 
•  pillar 2: supervisory review and 
•  pillar 3: market discipline.  
2.3.1  Pillar 1 – Measuring credit and operational risks for capital 
requirements 
The computation of the minimum supervisory capital under the first pillar 
will be based on the sum of the capital requirements originating from: 1) 
credit risk, 2) market risk and 3) operational risk (see Box 5).  34 | RYM AYADI 
 
Box 5. The capital ratio under Basel II 
Regulatory capital / risk-weighted assets (measure revised) = minimum required 
capital ratio (8% minimum unchanged) 
Credit risk exposure (measure revised) + market risk exposure (measure unchanged) 
+  
operational risk exposure (explicit measure added) 
 
The main novelties in the first pillar are the variety of approaches for 
estimating the minimum supervisory capital, which include the 
standardised approach and the IRB approaches (i.e. the foundation and the 
advanced IRB approaches). In the standardised approach, the risk weights 
will be based on a rating that is provided by external credit assessment 
institutions or other institutions accepted by national supervisors such as 
export credit agencies. In the IRB approaches, the rating is produced 
internally by a bank risk-management system.  
1.  Measuring credit risk under the standardised approach 
In the standardised approach,45 the amount of capital required on an 
unsecured €1 loan to a private firm – now fixed at 8 cents (8% x €1) – could 
decrease to 1.6 or increase to 12 cents, based on the ratings issued by the so-
called ‘external credit assessment institution’ (ECAI). 
A bank will be allowed to use the ratings of more than one ECAI, but 
some precise rules will prevent any opportunistic (‘cherry-picking’) 
behaviour. Thus, banks will not be allowed to choose, for each customer, 
the rating source assigning the most favourable judgement (thereby 
reducing the total amount of regulatory capital). 
The risk categories broken down by the ECAI will correspond to 
different risk weights, a process known as ‘mapping’.  
Better ratings (type AAA-AA) will bring about lower weights in the 
computation of risk-weighted assets; moreover, as in Basel I, different 
categories of counterparties (e.g. non-financial firms, states or banks) will 
receive different sets of coefficients. This is summarised in Table 13, where 
ratings by Standard and Poor’s are used as a sample scale.  
 
                                                      
45 The description of the standardised and other Basel II approaches has been 
drawn from Ayadi & Resti (2004).   
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Table 13. Risk weights in the standardised approach (%) 
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Corporate   20 50  100  150  100  150 
   Sovereigns  0  20  50  100  150  100   
   Banks  20  50  100  150  50   
   Banks, based on their  
  country of incorporation 
20 50  100  150  150  100   
Retail   75 150 
  Residential mortgages  35  100 
  Commercial real estate 
  mortgages 
From 100 to 50% according to national supervisors  150 
Note: Ratings by Standard and Poor’s have been used as a sample scale. 
Source: Ayadi & Resti (2004). 
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Although the table may look complex at first glance, its meaning is 
quite intuitive:  
•  Rows indicate the different classes of borrowers identified by Basel II 
(corporates, sovereign entities, banks, small firms and individuals 
labelled as ‘retail’) plus some specific facilities. 
•  Columns report the various ratings or risk categories that can be 
assigned to counterparty.  
By combining rows and columns, one sees that, for example, a €100 
loan to a AAA-rated non-financial company will translate into €20 of risk-
weighted assets, and will therefore lead to a capital requirement of 20 x 8% 
= €1.6 (in other words, 1.6% of the unweighted exposure). Similarly, a €100 
facility offered to a sovereign state with a rating lower than B- will give rise 
to a €150 risk-weighted exposure, hence requiring a capital coverage of 150 
x 8% = €12 (12% of the face value). 
The last two columns warrant some brief clarification. First, unrated 
exposures (where no ECAI-issued rating is available) will usually be 
weighted at 100% (as in the present Accord). This is likely to apply to most 
European non-financial firms (although some of them will have access to 
better treatment if included in the retail portfolio, as explained below). 
Second, past-due loans towards the bank (where a delay of more than 90 
days has occurred on any payment) will usually be weighted at 150% (like 
the worst-rated classes), as payment delays could signal that the borrower 
is experiencing solvency problems. 
2.  Measuring credit risk under the IRB approaches 
If a bank chooses (and is allowed by the national supervisor) to create its 
own rating system (instead of depending on external agencies), the capital 
against each credit exposure will be a function of five basic risk parameters: 
1.  Probability of default (PD) is the default probability for a borrower over 
a one-year period. It is also known as the expected default frequency. 
A starting point of the measurement of PD is the definition of default. 
In general, the default event arises from the non-payment of principal 
or interest. It is commonly admitted that default occurs if payment is 
past due 90 days. These types of loans are characterised as ‘non-
performing’.  
2.  Loss given default (LGD) is the expected amount of loss on a facility 
provided to the borrower when s/he defaults. To determine LGD, a THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND SME FINANCING | 37 
 
bank must be able to identify the borrowers who defaulted, the 
exposures outstanding at the time of default and the amount and 
timing of repayments ultimately received. In addition, private 
information on the borrower and the availability of collateral could 
serve to develop the LGD estimates.  
3.  Exposure at default (EAD) is the amount the borrower owes at the time 
of default. The EAD is the sum of the current utilisation expressed as 
a percentage of the total commitment and the loan equivalent, which 
is the additional utilisation as a percentage of the unused 
commitment. 
4.  Remaining maturity of the exposure (m) raises the possibility that the 
original probability of default needs to be revised and possibly 
increased. 
5.  Finally, there is the degree of diversification and correlation (rho) of the 
credit portfolio to which the exposure belongs. 
The expected loss is a simple multiplication of (PD*LGD*EAD). In 
conjunction with the maturity estimate of the exposure (m) and the 
diversification coefficient (rho), these risk parameters are used to determine 
capital for both economic capital and Basel II regulatory capital models.  
Risk weights and thus capital requirements would be determined by 
a combination of a bank providing the quantitative inputs and the 
supervisor providing the formulas. The details for calculating capital 
charges could vary somewhat according to the type of exposure (sovereign, 
corporate, retail, etc.).  
There are two IRB approaches: the foundation and the advanced. The 
difference between the two is that the former would require the bank to 
determine only each loan’s probability of default and the supervisor would 
provide the other risk inputs; under the latter, the bank would determine 
all the risk parameters internally, based on estimations and procedures 
validated by the supervisor. The choice of operating under either of the two 
approaches would be required to meet minimum qualifying criteria based 
on the comprehensiveness and integrity of the banks’ internal capabilities 
for assessing the risk inputs relevant for each approach. Table 14 presents 
more details on the estimation/computation of the above-mentioned risk 
factors. 
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Table 14. Risk factors included in the IRB approaches 
Factor  Meaning  Computation in the foundation approach  Computation in the advanced approach 
PD  Probability 
that the 
borrower is 
unwilling or 
unable to pay  
The PD must be computed over a one-year risk horizon, accounting for possible deteriorations in the borrower’s 
creditworthiness in the medium to long term. 
LGD  Loss rate in 
the event of 
default 
The LGD is fixed at 45% for all senior, unsecured 
e x p o s u r e s .  T h i s  v a l u e  m u s t  b e  r a i s e d  t o  7 5 %  f o r  
subordinated exposures, but can be adjusted 
downwards  when some recognised collateral is 
pledged against the loan. When the collateral is an 
eligible financial instrument, the LGD can be reduced 
down to 0%, based on the value of the collateral and 
on a system of regulatory haircuts. Three types of 
non-financial collateral are also accepted: receivables, 
real estate (commercial and residential) and other 
collateral (including physical capital, but excluding 
any assets acquired by the bank as a result of a loan 
default). These non-financial collaterals may drive the 
LGD down to 40% (35% for receivables and real 
estate).  
Banks will be allowed to use their own estimates of 
LGDs, provided that they can persuade supervisors 
that their models are conceptually sound and 
consistent with their past experience. LGDs will have 
to be assessed in an economic sense rather than from a 
mere accounting perspective: when measuring 
recovery rates, all relevant factors that may reduce the 
final economic value of the recovered part of the 
exposure must be taken into account. This includes the 
discount effect associated with the time elapsed 
between the emergence of the default and the actual 
recovery, but also the various direct and indirect 
administrative costs associated with collecting on the 
exposure. 
EAD  Exposure at 
default 
EAD is computed at 100% of current exposure, plus 
75% of undrawn irrevocable commitments. Off-
balance sheet exposures will have to be converted 
into credit equivalents by means of standard credit-
conversion factors. 
 
Banks will be allowed to use their own estimates of 
EAD, provided that they can persuade supervisors that 
their models are conceptually sound and consistent 
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Maturity  Time to 
maturity of 
the loan 
Maturity is conventionally set at two and a half years.  Maturity must be computed as a zero-rate financial 
duration and will be capped at five years. Maturities 
shorter than one year will be allowed only in very 
specific cases.  
Correlation  Correlation 
between the 
changes in 
the value of 
the assets of 
any two 
borrowers in 
the loan 
portfolio 
A rather high correlation (24%) is used for loans to highly-rated, large non-financial firms (the so-called 
‘corporate’ portfolio); this is owing to the fact that such companies are supposed to fail mainly because of 
systemic shocks (that tend to hit all obligors at the same time). The correlation grows lower (from 24% to 12%) as 
the borrower’s rating worsens: in this case, in fact, idiosyncratic factors are thought to be the main driver behind 
default risk. 
The two extreme values seen above (24% and 12%) are scaled down, towards 20% and 8% respectively, when 
the borrower’s turnover is less than €50 million. This is because small firms, too, are supposed to be affected 
mainly by idiosyncratic risks. 
Correlations grow even thinner (17% for highly-rated borrowers and 2% for low-rating counterparties) in the 
case of loans to individuals and small firms included in the ‘retail’ portfolio. For the so-called ‘qualifying 
revolving-retail exposures’ (mainly credit cards and overdrafts issued at a very high interest rate), the 
correlation coefficients for high and low-quality borrowers range from 11 to 2%. Finally, a fixed correlation of 
15% is used in the case of residential mortgages. 
Source: Ayadi & Resti (2004).40 | RYM AYADI 
 
3.  Measuring operational risk under pillar 1 
The new capital requirements will not be limited to credit risk: a 
considerable amount of capital will have to be held against operational risk. 
Operational risk is defined as “the risk that flaws in a bank’s own systems 
or human resources, as well as external events, may cause unexpected 
losses, such as those related to mass litigation, fraud or natural 
catastrophes”.46 To measure operational risk, three approaches are 
provided by the Accord:  
•  the basic indicator approach,  
•  the standardised approach and 
•  the advanced measurement approaches.   
Under the basic indicator approach, banks are required to hold a 
capital cushion against operational risks equal to 15% of their total gross 
income (measured as a three-year moving average). This just reflects the 
fact that larger banks are subject to a higher amount of risk since they are 
expected to have higher gross income. 
Under the standardised approach (note that this is not, in any way, 
related to the standardised approach to credit risk), the banks’ gross 
income is split among eight business lines: corporate finance, trading and 
sales, payment and settlement, commercial banking, agency services, retail 
banking, asset management and retail brokerage. For the first three lines, 
which are supposed to be more exposed to operational risks, the 15% 
coefficient is raised to 18%; symmetrically, it is lowered to 12% for the last 
three lines, which are thought to be less risky.  
The advanced measurement approach is designed to be more 
sensitive to operational risk and is intended for internationally active banks 
that have significant exposure to operational risk. It seeks to build on 
banks’ rapidly developing internal assessment techniques and would allow 
banks to use their own methods for assessing their exposures, as long as 
these methods are judged by supervisors to be sufficiently comprehensive 
and systematic.  
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2.3.2  Pillar 2 – Supervisory review 
The supervisory review process carried out by national authorities will 
play a key role under the new Accord in prompting banks to develop, 
refine and make better use of risk-measurement techniques. This second 
pillar will translate into four main lines of action. The national regulators 
will: 
•  check that the bank’s risk-management systems comply with the 
specifications included in the first pillar of the Accord (such as 
transparency, integrity and consistency of the internal rating system); 
•  evaluate risks that fall under the provisions of the first pillar, but 
which may be imperfectly estimated by its computation formulae (for 
example the correlation and concentration effects included in the new 
Accord through a set of standard values may not be appropriate for 
individual banks); 
•  assess risks not included under the first pillar (e.g. the interest-rate 
risk originated by the different maturity mix of assets and liabilities); 
and 
•  evaluate how the economic cycle could affect the bank’s future capital 
adequacy. Such effects will have to be estimated though ‘stress tests’, 
simulating how the bank’s capital requirements would change if a 
recession were to occur.  
In the prudential supervision process, regulators will:  
a)  verify that each bank has a sound system in place to assess its own 
capital needs and a sensible strategy to ensure that its capital remains 
adequate in the future;  
b)  review and validate such a system, taking appropriate steps 
whenever it is not fully satisfactory;  
c)  impose capital requirements above and beyond the regulatory 
minimum stated in the first pillar if necessary; and  
d)  act in a quick and timely manner (asking for prompt corrective 
actions) to prevent the bank’s capital from falling below the 
minimum threshold suggested by its risk profile. 
2.3.3  Pillar 3 – Market discipline  
The third pillar aims at providing the market participants (particularly the 
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assess the risk profile of a bank. They will then be able to discipline banks 
operating with an inadequate capital endowment or an ineffective risk-
management system (or both).  
Banks are therefore required to release a set of minimum data, both 
quantitative (e.g. capital adequacy measures and the main aggregates on 
which capital computation is based) and qualitative (risk-assessment 
methodologies and related organisational processes). Bank disclosure of the 
internal rating systems provided for distinct portfolios, including SME 
portfolios, is generally perceived as a step forward to increase 
transparency. Nevertheless, the degree of transparency and disclosure is 
not precisely defined and there is still vast room for manoeuvre. More 
specifically, nothing is said about disclosing the rating or the criteria used 
for a specific borrower. The transparency requirements of the third pillar 
do not apply to any exclusive or confidential information that, if made 
known to the bank’s competitors, could decrease the value of the bank or 
reduce its competitive advantage. 
As a rule, the information required by the third pillar must be 
released every six months (every year for qualitative data concerning the 
bank’s credit policies, reporting and management systems; every quarter 
for quantitative data on capital ratios and related aggregates).  
2.3.4  Implementation of Basel II in Europe 
At the European level, the new Basel framework provided substantial 
background to revise the EU’s proposals for the CRD.47 In July 2004, a 
proposal for an updated Capital Requirements Directive was published. It 
mainly kept the same provisions introduced in the Basel II text. Some 
variations were introduced, however, to accommodate the European 
context. The new Directive was adopted by the European Parliament on 28 
September 2005.  
Although originally required to be applied by internationally active 
banks, the CRD will target all credit institutions and investment firms 
irrespective of their size, activities or levels of sophistication. The 
implementation date should follow the same timeframe as that foreseen in 
                                                      
47 Directive 2000/12/EC of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of 
the business of credit institutions and Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the 
capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (European 
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the original Basel II framework (i.e. a gradual implementation from 1 
January 2007 for the simplest approaches and 1 January 2008 for the most 
advanced ones). 
The scope of application of the new Directive is highly challenging 
since it should be appropriate for small, medium-sized and large banks as 
well as investment firms on the grounds that they carry out similar 
activities and risks. In order to smooth the transition to the new regulatory 
framework of such a large population of financial institutions varying in 
size and sophistication, and to make risk-sensitivity achievable by all of 
them, the Commission has introduced some flexible, European-specific 
solutions: 
•  The proposed ‘roll-out’ rules for the IRB approaches will allow credit 
institutions to move different business lines and exposure classes to 
the foundation or the advanced IRB approach during a reasonable 
timeframe (Art. 85 of the revised Directive).  
•  Small and medium-sized banks will be allowed partial use of the IRB 
approaches for some exposures, combined with continued use of the 
standardised approach for exposures to sovereigns and financial 
institutions (Art. 89 of the revised Directive). 
•  Preferential treatment (lower capital charges as compared with the 
Basel II original text) will be accorded to private equity and venture 
capital investments when they are considered to be “sufficiently 
diversified” (Annex VI and Annex VII of the revised Directive).  
•  Covered bonds will also be given special treatment (Annex VI of the 
revised Directive). 
•  Small investment firms will be exempt from the new operational risk 
charges, reflecting their risk profile and limited systemic importance. 
Moreover, to assess the likely impact of these new rules on the 
European economy, the European Council of Ministers requested48 the 
Commission to present a report on the consequences of the Basel II 
deliberations for all sectors of the European economy with particular 
attention given to SMEs. In response, the Commission contracted 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Risk Management in partnership with the 
National Institute for Economic and Social Research to prepare the study. 
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The study49 concluded that the rules would have a positive impact of the 
new rules on Europe’s financial institutions, corporates and SMEs.  
For the time being, it is difficult to make an exhaustive evaluation of 
the effects of the new CRD. But at first glance, a more risk-sensitive 
calibration and a more obvious linkage between a bank’s own risk-
management and mitigation techniques along with regulatory capital 
requirements may provide a natural incentive for banks to implement the 
most sophisticated tools to manage their risks. Nevertheless, it is important 
to proceed with a cost-benefit analysis, particularly for small and medium-
sized banks that may or may not have the necessary resources to 
implement such onerous tools. Moreover, if these costs are passed on to 
consumers and SMEs, their financing conditions may deteriorate and this 
in turn would adversely impact their growth.  
2.3.5  How do Basel II and the CRD define and treat SMEs? 
Under Basel II and the CRD,50 SMEs are defined as companies with an 
annual turnover of less than €50 million. The annual turnover criterion can 
be substituted by total assets at the discretion of the national supervisor. 
Within the SME category, there is an additional distinction between 
corporate and retail SMEs. First, SMEs are treated in the corporate asset 
class when the total annual sales are less than €50 million and total 
exposure to a bank is greater than €1 million. A discount factor that can 
reach 20% is introduced to correct the asset risk weights on the basis of the 
borrower’s size.51 Second, SME loans below an exposure size of €1 million 
can be treated in the retail portfolio52 (this is subject to a concentration limit 
and to the requirement that the lending institution actually treats such 
exposures as retail).53 The capital requirement in the retail portfolio is less 
than the corporate portfolio. 
                                                      
49 European Commission (2004a).  
50 See Art. 79 of the new CRD proposals. 
51 The firm-size adjustment factor is an algorithm that modifies the asset 
correlation in reverse proportion to the SME’s size. 
52 Banks considered the retail definition to be arbitrary, rather conservative and 
unable to reflect how they determine retail and corporate exposures boundaries.  
53 This provision encourages banks to treat as many clients as possible under the 
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At first glance, it is obvious that the definition adopted by the Basel 
Committee is different from that of the European Commission (2003) as a 
consequence of the different focus each has had. The Basel II and CRD 
definition only considers the annual turnover and the size of the exposures, 
irregardless of the number of employees or the total balance sheet of the 
SME. What matters is managing the risk of the exposures, which is 
consistent with the objective of limiting insolvencies in banks’ portfolios. 
The implementation of the CRD in Europe will certainly help to bring 
about a needed consistency between the two definitions. 
Many changes have been undertaken since the beginning of the 
process,54 aimed at giving adequate consideration to the capital charges 
imposed on lending to SMEs under the different approaches of the new 
Accord. On the one hand these changes have led to a decrease of capital 
charges on lending to SMEs and on the other hand have provided the 
possibility of differentiating between SMEs that are part of the retail 
portfolio and those that are part of the corporate one.55 Figure 4 shows the 
change of the slope of the risk weight curve as a function of the probability 
of default, indicating the more favourable treatment of the SME portfolio, 
either falling under the lowest part of the corporate portfolio or under the 
retail one.  
                                                      
54 For example, in the January 2001 consultation paper, the capital charges imposed 
on the SME portfolio were said to be excessive and could result in hindering their 
growth. 
55 CEPS carried out a survey on the practical implications of the new Basel II 
Accord for the European financial system. A questionnaire was distributed to 250 
participants at a conference jointly organised by CEPS with FESE (Federation of 
European Securities Exchanges) and PwC (PricewaterhouseCoopers) on “The 
Changing Regulatory Regime in Europe: A Challenging New Business Concept” in 
November 2003 in Brussels. This conference brought together market participants, 
regulators and academics to discuss the issues raised by the Basel II consultation 
process almost a month after the Madrid compromise. Accordingly, in order to 
obtain a direct assessment of how deeply the current proposal has been 
understood and accepted or even rejected throughout the European financial 
industry, CEPS undertook a statistical analysis of the 54 relevant responses 
collected. When asked about the extent to which SME financing had become a 
political issue, 88% of respondents confirmed the political nature of the SME 
financing debate and 70% indicated that the agreement on special treatment 
reached in July 2002 appears rather beneficial (Ayadi & De Rossi, 2004a).   46 | RYM AYADI 
 
Figure 4. Decrease in risk weights for corporate exposures (LGD 45%; maturity 
2.5 years) 
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According to the CRD, SMEs will be assessed under the three approaches:  
1.  For banks that choose to rate their risk exposures under the 
standardised approach:56 
•  SMEs that are treated as corporate borrowers will receive a risk 
weight of between 20 and 150%, depending on their rating class 
quality.57  
•  Unrated exposures will receive a 100% risk weight, which is 
equivalent to the current 8% of the unweighted loan.  
•  SMEs that are qualified as retail borrowers58 will receive a 75% 
risk weight.  
                                                      
56 See Annex VI of the CRD.  
57 As explained previously, the capital charge on a high-quality loan of €100 to an 
SME rated AAA to AA- is €20 of risk weighted asset multiplied by the original 8% 
leading to a total of €1.6 (in other words 1.6% of the unweighted exposure). In 
contrast, a low-quality loan to an SME will give rise to a capital charge of 150 x 8% 
= €12, which is 12% of the unweighted exposure. THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND SME FINANCING | 47 
 
•  The treatment of secured loans for SMEs has received particular 
attention in two cases. 
o  When the loans are secured by commercial real estate, in 
principle they will receive a risk weight of 100%. 
Nevertheless, national supervisors will be allowed to assign a 
reduced risk weight of 50% for 50% of the market value or 
60% of the mortgage-lending value when two supervisory 
tests are fulfilled.59  
o  When the loans are secured by mortgages on residential 
property, they will receive a risk weight of 35%.  
o  Any unsecured exposure will have a risk weight of 100%. 
•  The treatment of loans that are past due for more than 90 days 
will receive a risk weight of 150%.  
•  Finally, exposures associated with investments in venture capital 
firms and private equity will be assigned a risk weight of 150%.60 
For some cases, national supervisors will apply a risk weight of 
50% and 100% to such exposures.  
2.  Under the IRB approach,61 two alternatives are offered to banks 
according to whether they use the foundation or the advanced IRB to 
rate their SME portfolio. Some differences exist depending upon 
whether the SME is treated as a corporate or as a retail borrower: 
•  When an SME is treated as a corporate obligor under the 
foundation IRB approach, its risk weight depends on the PD, the 
LGD and the firm size. The LGD for uncollateralised positions is 
set at 45% and 75% of the loan and is explicitly subordinated.62 
                                                                                                                                       
58 Retail exposures are exposures that comply with the criteria laid down in Art. 
79(2) of the Directive proposal 2000/12/EC. 
59 These two tests are: a) the losses resulting from commercial real-estate lending of 
up to 50% of the market value and 60% of the mortgage-lending value must not 
exceed 0.3% of the outstanding loans in a given year; and b) overall losses resulting 
from commercial real-estate lending must not exceed 0.5% of the outstanding loans 
in a given year.  
60 This is subject to the discretion of competent authorities as per Annex VI, section 
11 of the CRD.  
61 See Annex VII of the CRD.  
62 A subordinated loan is a facility that is expressly subordinated to another 
facility. At national discretion, supervisors may choose to employ a wider 48 | RYM AYADI 
 
The level of LGD may, however, be reduced to 0% depending on 
the collateral (eligible financial collateral and receivables, and 
commercial and residential real estate will receive an LGD of 0% 
and 35% respectively). The formulas are given in Annex 2. 
•  Under the advanced approach, the bank is allowed to estimate the 
risk parameters of an SME exposure. Further, the internal 
estimates of LGD may lead to lower capital requirements if 
collateral exists. For uncollateralised positions, the advanced 
approach may lead to higher capital requirements as the LGD is 
not limited to 45%. As for EAD and maturity, the internal 
estimates may vary across banks and lead to higher or lower 
capital charges.  
•  When an SME fulfils the qualifying criteria to be treated as a retail 
exposure, a bank must provide its own estimates of the 
underlying risk components irrespective of whether it is applying 
the foundation or the advanced IRB approach. The risk weight 
depends on the estimates of the PD, LGD and EAD. This would 
theoretically lead to lowering the capital requirement compared 
with the risk-weight function for corporates.  
•  Under the IRB approach,63 any equity exposure is subject to a set 
of considerations as outlined below.  
o  If a bank is using the simple market-based approach, this will 
entail risk weights of 190% for private equity exposures in 
sufficiently diversified portfolios, 290% for exchange-traded 
equity exposures and 370% for other equity exposures. These 
risk weights are much lower than those originally applied in 
the Basel II text. 
o  Otherwise, the other approaches (the PD/LGD approach and 
internal models approach) may trigger more differentiated 
risk weights depending on the risk type of these exposures. 
Under the original Basel II framework, these risk charges 
could not be lower than 200% for firms with publicly traded 
equities and 300% for those with private equities. For some 
                                                                                                                                       
definition of subordination. This may include economic subordination, such as in 
cases where the facility is unsecured and the bulk of the borrower’s assets are used 
to secure other exposures. 
63 See Annex VII, section 1.3 of the CRD.  THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND SME FINANCING | 49 
 
long-term investments or existing positions, exemptions or 
transitional arrangements may apply and lead to a risk weight 
of 100%. All other investments will imply significantly higher 
capital charges.  
2.3.6  How does the CRD treat collateral? 
Under the CRD proposal, the European Commission has made a 
distinction between funded and unfunded credit protection.  
Funded credit protection refers to a technique of credit-risk mitigation 
in which the reduction of the credit risk on the exposure of a credit 
institution derives from the right of the credit institution – in the event of 
default of the counterparty or on the occurrence of other specified credit 
events relating to the counterparty – to liquidate, to obtain transfer or 
appropriation of, to retain certain assets or amounts, to reduce the amount 
of the exposure to, or to replace it with the amount of the difference 
between the amount of the exposure and the amount of a claim on the 
credit institution (Art. 4 §31 of the revised Directive 2000/12/EC). In 
addition to residential and commercial real estate, all financial items 
including cash, certificates of deposit or comparable instruments issued by 
the lending bank, gold, debt securities, some qualified shares and mutual 
funds investing in the above-mentioned instruments, all listed shares and 
life insurance policies and other instruments issued by third-party 
institutions are considered to be eligible collateral under the funded credit 
protection. 
Unfunded credit protection refers to a technique of credit-risk 
mitigation in which the reduction of credit risk on the exposure of a credit 
institution derives from the undertaking of a third party to pay an amount 
in the event of the default of the borrower or on the occurrence of other 
specified events (Art. 4 §32 of the revised Directive). The eligible providers 
of unfunded protection are detailed in Annex VIII, part 1 and in Annex VI 
part 4 of the revised Directive 2000/12/EC.  
Under the standardised and IRB foundation approaches, besides 
residential and commercial real estate, other types of collateral are 
acceptable, including a wide range of financial collateral. Each type is 
subject to a different treatment:  
1.  Under the simple approach, the portion of the exposure covered by 
recognised collateral receives the risk weight applicable to the 50 | RYM AYADI 
 
collateral itself, not to the original borrower (usually subject to a floor 
of 20%).  
2.  Under the comprehensive approach, no capital requirement is 
applied to the collateralised portion of the exposure, but the value of 
the collateral must be trimmed by a fraction (a discount factor), 
reflecting the risk that the market value of the financial instrument 
pledged by the borrower may decrease before it is revaluated or 
remargined.  
Guarantees and credit derivatives are considered to be forms of 
unfunded protection. They are acceptable under the standardised and IRB 
foundation approaches as credit risk mitigants, provided that they are 
eligible and fulfil the minimum requirements set in the revised Directive 
2000/12/EC (Annex VIII, part 2).  
Under the IRB advanced approach, besides the eligible collateral 
recognised under the standardised and the IRB foundation approaches, 
other forms of collateral known as eligible IRB collateral are also 
recognised. These include accounts receivable, specified commercial and 
residential real estate and other collateral subject to fulfilment of minimum 
requirements.  
The treatment of receivables is a novelty (see Annex 3). The principle 
is to extend the risk analysis of the borrower’s business, industry and the 
clients with whom the borrower does business. Hence, the bank is able to 
review the borrower’s credit practices to assess their soundness and 
credibility.64  
The treatment of guarantees and credit derivatives under the IRB 
advanced approach closely follows the treatment under the standardised 
and IRB foundation approaches. Their eligibility and recognition are also 
subject to the minimum criteria set by the revised Directive 2000/12/EC in 
Annex VII, part 4.  
Credit insurance can be perceived as a type of guarantee. It could be 
classified as unfunded credit protection and hence could mitigate credit 
risk. Nevertheless, credit insurance could be recognised in the group of 
guarantees as long as it fulfils some minimum requirements common to 
guarantees and credit derivatives and other operational requirements 
                                                      
64 This process could be time-consuming for bankers as it also requires following-
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relating to risk-management processes to qualify as a credit-risk mitigant. 
Therefore, this recognition is conditional and the question remains of 
whether conditional insurance policies can match the requirements of the 
recognised guarantees. Moreover, this conditionality does not fully 
consider the credit-enhancement effect of the protection provided by credit 
insurance.  
In practice, this conditionality may limit the recognition of credit 
insurance under the new banking regulation and gives banking institutions 
much room for discretion to accept or reject this form of risk mitigation. 
2.4  Development of an internal credit rating system 
As previously noted, Basel II has introduced a revolutionary approach to 
risk management, mainly to respond to the criticisms levelled against the 
current regulatory capital standards. More specifically, the failure of the 
present capital regime to capture the intrinsic credit risk in the banking 
business has led to a unanimous determination to rely on internally 
developed credit-risk models65 initiated by the industry and monitored by 
supervisors. 
This gives rise to the question of what is considered to be a ‘sound’ 
internal credit risk model. This description should be accorded to a system 
only when it meets the practical needs of the end users (the banks or other 
financial institutions that provide finance to SMEs) and wins the approval 
of the regulatory supervisors. Briefly stated, the model should be able to 
accomplish two important objectives:  
•  An internal rating model should be able to accurately assess and 
quantify the intrinsic credit risk embedded in the bank’s portfolio. In 
doing so, it should introduce both quantitative and qualitative 
measures that facilitate prudential portfolio risk-management.  
•  Ultimately, it must provide a mechanism that can be used to 
determine the economic capital requirement of a bank, and the 
resulting capital allocation framework must be robust enough to be 
used for risk-adjusted pricing and other strategic purposes.  
Figure 5 is a simplified attempt to illustrate the linkages between the 
essential components of a sound internal credit risk model. 
  
                                                      
65 See Crouhy et al. (2001) for a comparison of the current credit risk models.   
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Clearly, the initial inputs to the model are crucial. For the most part, 
these are highly dependent on the existing system infrastructure and data 
warehousing within a bank. The ability to extract customer-related 
information and current market rates on demand is vital. As an initial 
benchmark for assessing the creditworthiness of an obligor, the bank’s own 
risk-rating system must be sufficiently robust and granular to distinguish 
the different levels of credit quality. Other inputs required are the obligor-
specific information, such as the probabilities of defaults, recovery rates (or 
loss-given defaults), outstanding accounts, commitments and covenants.  
The next component of the model is the ability to calculate individual 
risk measurements, for example, expected loss, unexpected loss, adjusted 
exposure and the marked-to-market valuation of the underlying loan. 
Subsequently, given supplementary information such as macroeconomic 
variables, default correlation, sovereign-related quantities and other 
obligor-specific information, aggregate risk measures can be calculated on a 
portfolio basis. In order to attach a statistical confidence level to the capital 
required as a buffer against insolvency, the bank needs to use tools such as 
the Monte Carlo simulation66 and extreme value theory67 t o  a r r i v e  a t  a  
desired loss distribution for the portfolio. This leads to the ultimate outputs 
of the internal model such as risk-adjusted performance measurements, 
risk-adjusted pricing and economic capital requirements. 
Over the last two decades credit-rating models have allowed banks 
and other financial institutions to assess the risks incurred in their lending 
activities to SMEs more accurately. Indeed, rating models involve 
processing data about the firm and its owner using statistical models. The 
outcome of the whole process is a rating or a set of summary statistics 
about the borrower’s expected future loan performance.  
A note of caution, however, is that credit rating is not a ‘plug-and-
play’ approach in which one just inputs data into a computer and uses the 
                                                      
66 The Monte Carlo simulation is an analytical technique for solving a problem by 
performing a large number of trial runs (i.e. simulations) and inferring a solution 
from the collective results. It is a method for calculating the probability distribution 
of possible outcomes. 
67 Extreme value theory is a branch of statistics dealing with the extreme deviations 
from the median of probability distributions. The general theory sets out to assess 
the type of probability distributions generated by processes. Extreme value theory 
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output at its face value. It requires a major investment in time, technology, 
training and human resources. Financial institutions have the choice to 
either develop their own internal credit rating system or to share external 
rating solutions by pooling data. The pooling of data allows for the creation 
of a data source that is large enough to undertake historical analysis and 
enables lenders to benefit from tools that would otherwise not have been 
available. One classic example is the use of credit bureau data to create 
pooled risk ratings.  
We next focus on the development stages of an internal rating (or 
scoring) model, since banks that choose to apply the IRB approach will 
have to implement their own internal models to assess credit risks.  
First however, we review the system components associated with 
loans to SMEs. 
2.4.1  Recap of the main risk components of a loan to SMEs  
It is important for SMEs to understand the process followed by banks in 
assessing credit risk in order to be able to transmit the detailed information 
that banks need to evaluate their creditworthiness. When using the IRB 
approaches, banks consider the following components: 
1.  PD – probability of default by the borrower; 
2.  EAD – outstanding part of the loan (still to be repaid, hence 
outstanding risk) or exposure at default; 
3.  LGD – probability that the financial institution does not succeed in 
recovering the debt once default has occurred; and 
4.  M – maturity of the loan. 
Capital requirements are computed according to predetermined and 
simple formulas based on the four components of risks.68 The main 
principle of the internal rating is that the financial institution is able to 
cover expected losses69 (EL) with the provisions and unexpected losses 
(UL)70 with its own capital. Basically, capital requirements address the 
unexpected losses, which must be fully covered by a bank’s lending rates. 
Expected losses, however, are treated as a cost and not as a risk, and are 
computed by multiplying the PD, the LGD and the EAD.  
                                                      
68 Refer to Annex 2. 
69 Expected loss is a mean of the future losses.  
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As already seen, Basel II presents two IRB approaches: 
•  Under the foundation IRB approach, the rating is focused on the 
estimation of PD, that is, the probability that a company does not 
repay. 
•  Under the advanced IRB approach, besides estimating the PD, the 
rating takes also EAD and LGD into account. 
Probability of default is the most important component of credit risk. It is 
essential to the two approaches foreseen by both Basel II and the CRD and 
is therefore the main determinant of capital reserves. The risk elements 
interact as shown in Figure 6: 
•  An SME can have a PD within a category or a class, for instance, 
between 0.01% and 10%. 
•  The EAD will range in general between 50% and 100% of the loan. 
Default often occurs soon after lending. The lower the outstanding 
loan, the less frequently default occurs.  
•  LGD most commonly fluctuates between 20% and 100%. The worst 
scenario is that the bank/financial institution does not recover any of 
the defaulted amounts, and hence, the recovery rate is 0 and the LGD 
is 100%. In the best scenario, recovery rate will reach 80% of the 
principal outstanding; hence the LGD will be reduced to 20%. 
Figure 6. Interaction of the three elements of risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mercer Oliver Wyman (2004). 
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The effect of these elements in the capital requirement is the following: 
•  PD can multiply a given capital requirement by 100. 
•  EAD can multiply a given capital requirement by 2. 
•  LGD can multiply a given capital requirement by 5. 
Thus PD is also the most determinant factor for calculating capital 
requirements. 
Rating an SME consists of applying a statistical system that multiplies a 
series of descriptive ratios by a set of coefficients, which results in a certain 
value (a rating or score). This value allows for comparison between SMEs, 
establishing a sort of risk gradient: the higher the value is, the higher the 
probability of default. The value corresponds to a determined risk category, 
and this risk category is associated with a PD. Therefore, to analyse the 
impact of a certain rating system, we must look at the ratios used. 
To illustrate this, the external rating agencies provide a matrix with 
the gradual classification of risks. Each rating corresponds implicitly to a 
PD. As previously discussed, the risk mapping is used directly under the 
standardised approach (Table 15), whereas under the IRB approaches, PD 
and the other risk components are estimated internally.  
Table 15. Ratings and corresponding PDs 
Ratings (S&P)  PD (in %) 
AAA 
AA+ 
AA 
AA- 
A+ 
A 
A- 
BBB+ 
BBB 
BBB- 
BB+ 
BB 
BB- 
B+ 
B 
B- 
0.01 
0.02 
0.03 
0.04 
0.05 
0.07 
0.09 
0.13 
0.18 
0.32 
0.53 
0.93 
1.57 
2.64 
4.46 
7.52 
Source: Soley Sans & Rahnema (2004). THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND SME FINANCING | 57 
 
2.4.2  Other key elements and the development phases of an internal credit 
rating system  
The use of data to run objective quantitative and statistical models to 
evaluate credit risk is commonly known as either a credit rating system or a 
credit scoring model.71 The outcome of this automated process is a rating or 
a score that will assist the decision-making process. 
A credit rating model applies different weights to the characteristics 
used to predict the performance. The weights (or values) measure the 
influence of that characteristic on the outcome. The weights and the levels 
of influence are determined by statistical analysis. Only those 
characteristics that exert a significant influence will be included in the final 
model. The outcome or performance is the business metric to be evaluated 
in order to improve the decision-making process; the score or rating 
assigned to any application is the sum of the appropriate weights given by 
the values of each characteristic included in the model.     
In order to perform well, research points to several characteristics that are 
essential for rating systems. They must be: 
•  understandable – the rating system must be easy to verbalise and 
should be understandable not only statistically but also in business 
terms; 
•  powerful – the system must be able to discern clearly between good 
and bad payers;  
•  weighted up by default probability – the system must be able to 
indicate the probability that an individual client could become a bad 
payer; and  
•  empirically valid – the system must have shown its predictive 
capacity.  
Rating systems take into account different types of information concerning 
SMEs. Complete rating systems have three modules.  
1)  The first module is comprised of economic and financial information 
on the firm from corporate accounts (balance sheets as well as profit 
and loss accounts). This information is normally available for the 
majority of firms. The economic and financial data must be credible 
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and reliable (the companies must be audited by reliable auditing 
institutions).  
2)  The second module is constructed upon the qualitative data of the 
enterprise, such as its management, internal processes and human 
capital base. This data is often gathered on the company’s premises.  
3)  The third module involves an analysis of a bank’s proprietary 
information on the borrower (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Information considered in a rating 
 
Source: Soley Sans & Rahnema (2004). 
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Some of the information gathered is used to approximate the PD. 
Other data play a decisive role in the estimation of the level of exposure of 
the firm (EAD) and severity (LGD) associated with the recovery rate, such 
as the availability of physical or financial collateral, or guarantees from 
banks, credit insurance or the principal owner, affiliates or parent firms.  
If a default occurs, the estimation of the LGD and EAD are computed 
by a separate rating model generally used at the origination of the loan. 
This rating model serves to re-evaluate the collateral and guaranties to 
allow the calculation of the recovery rate when the default occurs.   
Four different stages can be identified in the elaboration of a rating 
associated with a PD: 
1)  the gathering of historical information, 
2)  analysis of individual factors, 
3)  specification and estimation of the model and 
4)  verification of PD accuracy. 
Phase 1. Collection of historical information 
First the rating system of the bank needs to identify the financial and 
economic profile of the firm from the inception of historical data (year 1, 
year 2, etc.). These data are either bank-held information or obtained 
through the national central bank of each country, private external credit 
bureaus, etc. The rating system needs to reflect the evolution of the credit 
liabilities of the firm. More specifically, was the company able to repay 
debt? Did any problems arise that caused default? See Figure 8. 
Figure 8. Compilation of historical data 
Source: Soley Sans & Rahnema (2004). 
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The information collected allows for the calculation of predictive 
ratios that reflect the criteria below, linked to the type of data (qualitative 
and quantitative). 
Quantitative data 
•  Performance (i.e. the result of ordinary activities/total assets and 
cash-flow generation)  
¾  The higher and the steadier these ratios are, the better the rating 
and the lower the probability of default. This is an indication of 
the capacity of the company to generate returns and therefore to 
meet its credit obligations. 
•  Leverage (i.e. own capital or equity and total debt) 
¾  The higher this ratio is, the better the rating and the lower the 
probability of default. A higher equity ratio reflects a stronger 
balance sheet.  
•  Debt coverage (i.e. net profit plus non-cash expenses/short-term 
debt) 
¾  The higher this ratio is, the better the rating and the lower the 
probability of default. This is an indication of the capacity of the 
company to pay short-term debt interest. 
•  Liquidity (i.e. cash/short-term debt or cash/total assets or accounts 
payable/total assets) 
¾  The higher this ratio is, the better the rating and the lower the 
probability of default, as this shows that the company has 
sufficient liquidity to absorb short-term debt.  
•  Growth (i.e. sales growth) 
¾  The steadier sales growth is, the better the rating and the lower 
the probability of default. A sustainable growth in sales is an 
indication of the future prosperity of the company. 
•  Productivity (i.e. sales/assets) 
¾  The higher this ratio is, the better the rating and the lower the 
probability of default. This ratio indicates the capacity of the 
company to generate sales from the employment of its assets.  
•  Size (i.e. annual total assets and annual total turnover) THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND SME FINANCING | 61 
 
¾  Total assets/total turnover indicate how large the company is and 
to which bracket it belongs in the bank’s assets (corporate versus 
retail portfolio).  
•  Other factors such as market conditions, particularly when firms have 
operations in emerging markets, past due loans, credit history, debt 
structure, the level of activity diversification, innovation capacity, the 
level of outstanding trade credit and merchandise disputes with 
suppliers/clients, etc. 
•  Macroeconomic factors (e.g. sovereign risk of the country where firms 
are located, export growth and commodity price levels) 
Qualitative data  
•  Development prospects of the industry 
•  Availability of a clear, well-structured and credible business plan 
•  Profile of the enterprise (activity sector, age, growth cycle, number of 
employees, etc.) 
•  Capacity/experience, reputation and past credit history of the 
entrepreneur/manager/owner 
•  Ownership and governance structure of the firm (the number of 
shareholders, the distribution of the shares, etc.)  
•  Management quality of accounts receivable 
•  Availability of collateral, guarantees, etc. This is a particularly 
important factor for a bank when it establishes a price for a loan. 
Providing valuable collateral helps to reduce the interest charges. 
Even if the rating is poor, providing collateral may help to obtain a 
loan with less stringent conditions.  
The validity of the data set constructed should fulfil three basic premises: 
•  coverage of a complete economic cycle – data collected must refer to 
different periods in time covering up to 10 years;  
•  sufficient quality of information – the ratios calculated must take into 
account a sufficient number of companies (ratios based upon a small 
number of companies must be disregarded); and 
•  data must be representative of the type of enterprise covered – 
models based on a certain typology of firms are not necessarily 
applicable to all firms of all types. 62 | RYM AYADI 
 
To check the validity of these criteria and to complement the list of 
quantitative and qualitative information needed for the purpose of this 
study, we sent a qualitative questionnaire72 to credit risk managers, 
compliance and auditing experts in some 150 banking institutions located 
throughout Europe. The questions mainly sought more information about 
the internal rating systems used by European banks. The banks were 
selected from a representative sample within the EU-15 plus some Eastern 
European countries.73 The sample included at least three lending 
institutions in different geographical areas. When possible, telephone 
contact was made with key persons within the bank to explain the purpose 
of the research. If they agreed to participate, very specific questions were 
posed through e-mail or follow-up telephone interviews to explore 
particular issues that either were not well understood or not identified in 
the questionnaire.  
Eight credit risk experts from eight banking institutions 
participated,74 geographically distributed as follows Denmark (2), France 
(2), Portugal (1), Germany (1), Finland (1) and Greece (1) along with two 
rating experts from two international rating agencies. Among these, three 
banks intend to comply with the partial use of the IRB approach and the 
other five are in the process of implementing the IRB approaches (four are 
in the process of applying the foundation approach and one the advanced 
approach). The eight banks consider SME lending as either very important 
to their business (between 20 and 40% of their assets) or the predominant 
                                                      
72 The questionnaire is reproduced in Annex 4. The intention of the questionnaire 
was to obtain information on the preparations made by banks to comply with the 
provisions of Basel II related to internal processes for managing credit risk. 
73 The Eastern European countries included Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and the Slovak Republic.  
74 Many reasons could explain the low rate of responses. First, some credit 
managers and/or experts were not prepared to give any responses on the internal 
rating system they used to manage credit risk. Second, some did not want to 
disclose aspects of their credit risk-management methods, noting this as 
confidential strategic information or stating that they would need the agreement of 
their board to discuss it. Third, some are not planning to adopt the IRB approaches 
for credit and operational risks. Finally, it should be noted that 15 questionnaires 
were sent back because the contact person was no longer working in the bank. The 
low rate of responses does not, however, affect the quality of the results as it is a 
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sector (more than 40% of their total assets). The majority consider that at 
least 20% of their overall SME exposures fulfil the requirements to be 
qualified as part of their retail portfolio.   
They indicated that the historical data they collect are based on easily 
gathered financial information from balance-sheet statements and profit-
and-loss accounts, mostly related to the factors mentioned above. 
Specifically, data are gathered with regard to the debt/capital structure, the 
ability of the SME to satisfy its credit obligations through the ratios 
concerning free cash-flow earnings before interest and taxes, the profit and 
loss structure and the business plan. These data are determinant when 
selecting potential borrowers.  
They added that the main qualitative factors taken into account are 
those related to the ownership structure, the legal form and the age of the 
enterprise, the managerial capabilities and reputation of the entrepreneur 
or owner (experience, age, creditworthiness and his/her share in the capital 
structure). To obtain this information, the respondent banks prefer to 
collect it directly from their customers and in some cases from private, 
external credit bureaus or public credit registries.  
The majority of the respondents mentioned the relevance of collateral 
and guarantees in the process of credit approval, notably when granting 
medium- to long-term credit. For example, when the collateral is very 
liquid such as cash or some types of debt securities, the pricing of the loan 
is lower since the bank is able to recover loan losses if default occurs. Other 
collateral such as real estate (commercial and residential) and receivables 
reduce the risk inherent in the loan but necessitate extensive assessment 
when the borrower defaults. Therefore, the recovery rates would vary 
depending on the loss given default (LGD) assigned to each loan.  
In general, collateral allows an extension of the credit line in terms of 
volume and duration and in some cases lowers the cost of credit. In 
particular, when the loan is pledged by accounts receivable, the respondent 
banks consider that well-managed accounts are far better perceived than 
those poorly managed. Credit insurance was mentioned by a few 
responding banks as a valuable guarantee on accounts receivable (or 
indemnification against default) and also in case the enterprise has 
operations in emerging markets where political risk may be a factor. It is 
also said to be a complete risk-management tool that helps management to 
put in place the necessary procedures to prevent and minimise late 
payments and defaults, thereby reducing the exposure of the receivables 64 | RYM AYADI 
 
portfolio and enhancing the capacity of using commercial credit as a 
competitive tool.  
Phase 2. Analysis of individual factors 
The objective of this stage is to determine which ratios best serve the 
construction of the final model. The relationship between each of the ratios 
and the dependent variable (default) and their predictive capacity must be 
analysed. Those factors offering a low predictive capacity must be excluded 
from the analysis, along with ratios presenting counterintuitive relations 
with default.  
Phase 2 is mainly a statistical exercise. It depends greatly on the 
activity sector of companies, their growth cycle and the overall business 
environment of the company.  
When asking the banking experts about the characteristics of this 
selection phase, they confirmed that it is done through statistical analysis of 
individual factors and ratios, which are selected according to their 
relevance in the decision-making procedure.  
Phase 3. Specification and estimation of the model 
The next stage is to carry out a multivariance analysis to assign weightings 
to the model, taking into account not only the individual predictive 
capacity (univariance) of each ratio, but also its co-relationship with other 
types of information. Other variables are introduced during this phase such 
as the diversification and the granularity of the portfolio. Phase 3 is 
essentially an econometric exercise. 
Phase 4. Obtaining the rating and the associated PD 
Once the model and weightings of the applicable ratios are set, the next 
stage seeks to systematise the assignment of the PD from the rating 
obtained through internal statistical models. The establishment of groups of 
percentiles that will define the rating of a company follows the ordering of 
enterprises according to their rating. For each rating level, a PD is obtained 
by observing the proportion of defaulted and non-defaulted companies 
that obtained that rating in the past.  
Responses by bank experts to questions concerning phases 3 and 4 
were very divergent, as some were advanced in the PD generation process 
and others were preparing to establish the best systems corresponding to THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND SME FINANCING | 65 
 
their businesses. Such divergence was expected, given the efforts underway 
to get ready for the new rating processes required by the Basel II and CRD 
regulations.  
Finally, depending on the bank or financial institution, the rating is 
updated every year, sometimes every quarter or month according to some 
risk managers. If the same conditions are maintained, the assigned rating is 
stable. If conditions improve (worsen), the rating will also improve 
(worsen).  
The respondent banks indicated that the main factors leading to credit 
downgrading are:  
•  the delayed submission of financial data; 
•  incomplete, unstructured or unclear financial data; 
•  a worsening of the business and financial factors of the company, 
such as loss of market share, decreased or negative earnings before 
interest and taxes, an increase in balance-sheet mismatches (long-
term commitments versus short-term liquidity), deterioration of 
liquidity, an increase of long-term debt, reduced equity ratio, 
recurring overspends, poor credit management within the company 
(more late and defaulted payers) and a rise in merchandise disputes 
with suppliers/clients;  
•  drastic changes in the ownership structure of the firm, such as the 
mortality of the owner/manager and absence of future plans or the 
loss of other key persons; and  
•  some macroeconomic factors such as an increase in the political risks 
where the company is located or a reduction of exports. 
They also mentioned that they look at excessive overdraft behaviour and 
blocked payments.  
2.4.3  A rating system in practice 
Rating systems are based on very objective mathematical and statistical 
systems that render the financing decisions more realistic for the particular 
situation of a given firm. In practice,  a rating system consists of: 
•  a mathematical formula that assigns a rating (or score) to a company 
based on a set of ratios; and  66 | RYM AYADI 
 
•  a correspondence to a risk group based on prior ratings and the 
present quality of the borrower, and finally the assignment of a PD.
75  
A practical example of a credit rating system is RISKCALCTm, a 
predetermined rating system produced by Moody’s KMV to accurately 
characterise the credit risk of private companies for faster underwriting 
decisions and providing efficient monitoring of portfolio credit trends. 
Using this system, we first describe the financial ratios that should be taken 
into account in the credit risk assessment exercise to produce the desired 
rating and the correspondent probabili t y  o f  d e f a u l t .  T h e n  w e  s h o w  t h e  
results given by the RISKCALCTm and offer some explanations based on 
different circumstances.  
The ratios that are weighted in the RISKCALCTm rating system are the 
following:  
•  Leverage ratios 
o  Own capital/debt – this is a measure of the level of non-
distributed profits relative to the total debt. 
o  Total debt/total assets – this is a measure to compare the level of 
debt relative to assets.  
The higher this ratio is, the higher the probability of default.  
•  Liquidity ratio (more specifically, cash/short-term debt) – the higher 
this ratio is, the lower the probability of default.  
•  Performance ratio (the result of ordinary activities/assets) – the 
higher this ratio is the lower the probability of default.  
•  Debt coverage ratios 
o  Net profit plus non-cash expenses/short-term debt – the higher 
this ratio is, the lower the probability of default.  
o  Cash flow/financial expenses – the higher this ratio is, the lower 
the probability of default.  
o  Financial expenses/net sales – the higher this ratio is the lower 
the probability of default. 
•  Growth (sales growth) – this is calculated between N and N-1; 
increased growth implies a lower probability of default. 
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•  Productivity (sales/assets) – the higher this ratio is, the lower the 
probability of default.  
The results of a simulation exercise of the data of some companies are 
reported in Table 16.  
The quality of the firms depends on the assigned rating and the 
correspondent probability of default. Each factor (input) is weighted 
according to its degree of importance. These weights may vary depending 
on the models used. The final result improves with the rating and the lower 
probability of default, revealing how easy it would be for the firm to obtain 
financing.  
For example, firm A has the best rating (AA3) associated with the 
lowest probability of default. It has the highest own capital/debts, 
liquidity, cash-flow/debt and cash-flow/financial expenses ratios in 
comparison with the other firms. On the opposite side of the table, firm K 
has the worst rating (B3) associated with a high probability of default 
(26%); this firm has low chances of obtaining a loan with good conditions 
since it is considered to be highly risky.  
These results are mainly based on the economic and financial data 
collected either directly or through some private credit bureaus or national 
credit registries. The ratings, however, may also depend on other 
information that may serve as alerts such as past due loans – for example, 
in the case of firm G, data collected from a private credit bureau showed 
that this company has a previous default history with other financial 
institutions, prior to the rating exercise performed by RISKCALCTm. The 
alert resulted in a downgrade of the company in question irregardless of its 
current economic and financial situation.  
It is important to note that historical data on the solvency of 
companies76 can serve as effective warnings that impact their actual and 
future financing. Other situations such as the loss of a key person in the 
firm, the loss of market shares, late payments from clients or low 
innovation capacity can cause the downgrading of the firm. These factors 
were confirmed by the majority of the banking experts who participated in 
the survey. 
 
                                                      
76 This data can be collected in the national credit registries, the judicial archives 
and in the central banks in each country.  
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Table 16. The calculation of an internal rating according to the rating system RISKCALCTm 
  Firm A  Firm B  Firm C   Firm D  Firm E  Firm F  Firm G  Firm H  Firm I  Firm J  Firm K 
Own capital/debts  4.155  2.69  1.018 0.262  0.515  0.557  0.942  0.074  0.088  0.125  -1.689 
Debt/asset -0.417  0.122  0.253 0.134  0.612  0.302  0.505  0.779  0.584  0.789  0.867 
Liquidity 3.425  0.526  0.998 2437  0.003  0.5  0.01  0.252  0.211  0.048  0.251 
Result of ordinary activities/assets  0.081  0.067  0.097 0.071  0.149  0.038  0.067  0.106  -0.016  0.02  -0.338 
Cash flow/debt  1.079  0.887  0.546 0.835  0.297  0.112  0.18  0.135  0.216  0.065  0.297 
Cash flow/financial expenses  157  –  11.677 6.709  25.952  1.096  5.226  6.276  2.062  2.216  -5.019 
Financial expenses/sales  0.001  0  0.022 0.029  0.014  0.038  0.028  0.03  0.038  0.042  0.138 
Sales/assets 1.259  0.732  0.949 0.402  0.501  1.309  0.639  0.635  1.831  0.576  0.384 
Sales growth   -0.073  0.121  0.085 -0.229  0.04  0.102  0.096  0.809  -0.186  0.13  -0.323 
Rating AA3  A1  A2 A3  BAA1  BAA2  BAA3  BA1  BA2  BA3  B3 
Probability of default (for one year) (%)  0.53  0.73  0.87 0.99  1.25  2.24  3.76  4.50  8.12  10.90  26 
Source: Example extracted from Soley Sans & Rahnema (2004). 
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In this practical example, the provision of collateral and guarantees 
was not included.  
At a further stage, the estimation of the probability of default will 
permit the calculation of the regulatory capital necessary to cover the risk 
carried in the portfolio of the bank or the financial institution. The higher 
the probability of default, the higher are the associated capital requirements 
and the poorer are the conditions for obtaining a loan.  
Firm A would receive a loan with very good conditions, whereas firm 
K would obtain a loan with more stringent conditions to account for the 
amount of risk the bank would be taking to offer the finance. 
2.4.4  The risk premium: The key component of the cost of credit  
As explained in the previous section, the risk premium depends on three 
components: the probability of default, the loss given default and the 
exposure at default.  
•  The estimation of PD is given by the internal rating, which depends 
on the economic and financial situation of the borrower and previous 
solvency history.  
•  The LGD is the estimation of the percentage of losses over the 
exposure minus its recovered part and associated costs. LGD depends 
on the guarantees and collateral provided by the borrowers, which 
are used to calculate the recovery rate. During interviews with a 
rating expert from an international rating agency and with a credit 
risk expert within a bank, they both mentioned that the use of 
guarantees and collateral are taken into consideration when 
calculating the recovery rates.  
•  EAD is the estimation of the amount used by the borrower at the time 
when she or he defaults. EAD is the sum of the amount of the loan 
used and a fraction (K) of the available loan. This fraction depends on 
the type of product and the rating of the borrower. 
A good estimation of the risk premium depends greatly on the 
accuracy of the client rating process. This process will allow their 
classification according to their creditworthiness by assigning a rating and 
a PD (see Figure 9).  
Moreover, rating is the key element for banks and other financial 
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number of financial institutions have been using risk-adjusted performance 
measures to measure their economic capital including: 
•  the return on risk-adjusted capital (RORAC); and  
•  the risk-adjusted return on risk-adjusted capital (RARORAC) also 
called ‘risk-adjusted return on capital’ (RAROC).  
In RAROC, the risk-adjusted return is the difference between 
financial revenues and financial costs minus the potential expected losses 
and the administrative costs. The risk-adjusted capital is the economic 
capital. This ratio can be calculated for each activity, department, unit, etc.  
Figure 9. Estimation of the risk premium 
Source: Soley Sans & Rahnema (2004). 
 
2.5  What is the likely impact of the CRD on SME financing in 
Europe?  
In Europe, the majority of SMEs rely on loan financing as previously 
shown; however, another option exists for a bank – which is to finance 
companies through equity, either directly or through venture capital. Basel 
II and the CRD will impact SME financing, which may at a first sight raise 
some questions about the overall consequences of these changes. Although 
the new Basel capital rules will certainly impact the credit conditions for 
SMEs, they may not necessarily lead to a reduction of credit supply to these 
entities.  
In terms of the cost of credit,  Basel II will directly affect three 
components of the cost of credit to SMEs. First, the administrative or 
operational cost resulting from the processes to originate and manage loan 
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management tools that require greater investment in infrastructure (data 
collection, database maintenance and adequate modelling) and human 
resources. Second, there is the cost of risk composed of the cost of capital, 
which is the opportunity cost resulting from the fact that banks need 
regulatory and risk capital to cover loan exposures, and finally the risk 
premium, which is linked to the probability of default of the borrower, the 
exposure at default and the loss given default. The impact of the new 
banking regulatory rules on these latter two costs is not straightforward 
since it will depend on the risk characteristics of the borrowers (see Box 6).  
Box 6. What impact does Basel II/CRD have on the cost of credit to SMEs? 
The consumption of the credit institution’s own resources (equity, subordinated 
debts and other reserves) has a direct relationship with the risk incurred by its 
credit and other operations. This is the essence of the risk premium, an 
important component of the cost of credit. Typically, the cost of credit includes: 
•  the refinancing cost, which is the price paid by the credit institution to its 
resource providers (the shareholders and other stakeholders); 
•  the administrative cost, which includes the cost of collecting, processing, 
analysing and evaluating the borrowers’ information, the follow-up and the 
control of the different lines of credit; 
•  the cost of the credit institution’s own resources (tier 1 and tier 2), which is 
the opportunity cost requested by the shareholders of the institution; 
•  the risk premium, which is the additional cost sought by the credit 
institution from each borrower to cover its expected and unexpected losses; 
and 
•  the credit institution margin, which is the profitability of the bank.  
Basel II/CRD will have an effect on: 
•  the administrative cost, owing to the more sophisticated evaluation process 
of credit risk; 
•  the cost of the credit institution’s own resources, because of its relationship 
to the consumption of capital, the risk of the portfolio and the higher capital 
requirements; and most importantly, 
•  the risk premium, by giving banks the opportunity to assess more 
effectively the risk incurred by its activities. This will be possible by 
introducing more risk-sensitive management techniques to assess distinct 
SME qualities. The risk premium will be lower when lending to good 
quality SMEs (or highly rated) and higher when lending to poor quality 
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The more risk-sensitive pricing introduced by the new rules through 
the IRB approaches will entail a certain variation in capital adequacy, 
depending ultimately on the individual quality of the borrowers. A poor-
quality borrower (rated B or CCC) will force its lender to hold more 
regulatory capital compared with a better-quality borrower (rated AAA or 
AA), but this does not ban loan financing.77  
As shown in Figure 10, lending to small businesses under the IRB 
approach would reward highly rated businesses by only requiring banks to 
hold approximately 2% of capital charges as compared with 8% under the 
current Basel rules. The low-rated firms will cause their lenders to hold 
more than 8% of capital charges to tax the high risk inherent in this type of 
business. Under the standardised approach, the risk sensitivity of the new 
rules is lost, which means that a bank is required to hold the 8% of capital 
charges irregardless of the quality of the borrower.   
 
Figure 10a. Capital charges by portfolio and approach: Medium to large 
corporations 
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Figure 10b. Capital charges by portfolio and approach: Small businesses* and 
individuals 
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On average, results from the third Quantitative Impact Study of 
European ‘group 2’ banks – those that are small and generally less complex 
and not internationally active – showed that no matter which category the 
SME exposure is assigned (to the corporate or the retail portfolio), the new 
regulatory capital rules will yield a lower SME risk weight compared with 
the existing framework (Table 17).  
Moreover, as noted earlier, the European Commission report (2004a) 
on the consequences of the Basel II rules for all the sectors of the European 
economy with a particular focus on SMEs concludes that the new Accord 
should not have any negative impact on the availability and cost of finance 
for SMEs in most European countries. It points out that worries about an 
increase in the cost of finance owing to an increased use of internal ratings 
in lending activity are not justified. On the contrary, capital requirements 
relating to SME credit risks are expected to decrease, notably when using 
IRB approaches.  
Other empirical studies78 undertaken to assess the possible effects of 
Basel II implementation on SMEs in Europe generally find that the new 
                                                      
78 See Schwaiger (2002) for the impact of Basel II on Austrian SMEs, Saurina & 
Trucharte (2004) for the impact on Spanish SMEs and Altman & Sabato (2005) for 
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banking rules lead to capital requirement savings linked to the SME 
segment when using one of the proposed approaches. When using the 
standardised approach, banks will enjoy more savings when SMEs are 
considered under the retail portfolio (the risk weight goes from 100 to 75%). 
When using one of the IRB approaches, banks are allowed to personalise 
the capital requirement calculations and build their own models to estimate 
PDs when using the foundation IRB approach and PDs, LGDs and other 
parameters when using the advanced IRB approach for each client.79  
Table 17. Changes in the capital requirements (as compared with the present 
Accord) for ‘group 2’ banks*: Total effect and contributions of 
individual sub-portfolios 
  Standardised (%)  Foundation IRB (%) 
Sovereign 0.03  0.69 
Bank 1.30  1.11 
Retail (including small businesses)  -9.33  -22.46 
Corporate -0.74  -3.79 
Corporate SMEs  -2.23  -4.93 
Operational risk  9.41  6.36 
Securitisation 0.07  -1.82 
Trading portfolio  0.10  0.05 
Specialised lending  -0.61  1.01 
Equity 0.14  1.37 
Receivables 0.00  0.00 
Investments in related entities  0.64  1.12 
Use of general provisions  0.00  -2.57 
Total -1.22  -23.86 
*Small and generally less complex banks that are not internationally active.  
Source:  European Commission (2003a). Individual data were weighted based on each bank’s 
relevance inside its national system; national data were weighted according to the 
amount of regulatory capital (tier 1 + tier 2 – deductions) present under the current 
Accord in each of the 15 EU member states. 
It should be borne in mind, however, that this average reduction does 
not mask a strong variation among banking institutions of different sizes 
                                                      
79 See Heitfield (2004) who explains how banks should choose their own rating 
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when adopting the standardised, foundation or advanced IRB approaches. 
Furthermore, different lending procedures and varying risk management 
expertise will lead to diverse outcomes throughout the banking industry, 
with better-rated banks able to manoeuvre more and lend at better rates. 
On the whole, it is very likely that banks opting for the more-advanced 
rating approaches would have a competitive advantage when lending to 
SMEs within the retail bracket. 
Indeed, these different approaches will certainly generate differences 
in capital requirements for different quality SME portfolios, favouring to 
some extent the large internationally active banks that are more willing to 
adopt the advanced IRB approach and thus benefit from a considerable 
capital discount on highly rated SMEs, notably those treated as retail. The 
high risk-sensitivity of the IRB approaches would benefit the investment 
grade SMEs and penalise the riskier ones (say B-rated borrowers and 
below). The latter will be less expensive for banks adopting the 
standardised approaches; the opposite is true for highly rated SMEs.  
The existence and the application of sophisticated credit-risk 
management tools will be a key element for banks to qualify for the 
advanced IRB approaches and in turn to ensure better risk-management of 
their credit portfolios, including the exposures to SMEs.  
Small- or medium-sized banking institutions that have poorer 
internal risk-management systems and are unwilling to install more 
sophisticated tools will have to adopt the standardised approach, which is 
a fairly improved version of the current capital regulatory rules. This does 
not lead to capital charges for the SME portfolio that are different from the 
current rules (on average the 8% capital requirements are kept regardless of 
the rating of the borrower); but it would result in a deterioration of their 
asset quality since they do not have the adequate rating system to isolate 
and reject high-risk borrowers. The greater risk sensitivity introduced 
when using the foundation IRB implies low capital requirements in 
particular for good quality SMEs and relatively high capital requirements 
for poor quality ones (see Figure 11).  
This is not necessarily bad news for SMEs, since a medium- to poor-
quality borrower is better off asking for a loan from a bank using a 
standardised approach, whereas highly rated SMEs are better off asking for 
loans from IRB banks.  
As previously explained, traditionally small and medium-sized banks 
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SMEs. While they have a strong long-term relationship80 with their clients 
based on local knowledge and experience (which helps to reduce 
information asymmetries), they may profit from their local dominant 
position by extracting ‘rents’ from SMEs, a situation that leads to higher 
charges. In this respect, it is important to monitor and ensure that anti-
competitive behaviour is kept under the competition authorities’ control. 
Figure 11. Capital charges by approach and portfolio type: The standardised 
approach vs the IRB foundation approach 
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Source: Ayadi & Resti (2004). 
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  Finally, the higher risk-sensitivity introduced in the new capital 
adequacy regime, while drawing a more precise picture of the 
creditworthiness of borrowers, is likely to raise capital charges in times of 
economic downturn. As a result, capital requirements may become a 
limitation for granting loans to SMEs and others, which in turn could 
intensify the economic slowdown. The pro-cyclical effect of the new Accord 
arises from the use of risk-sensitive techniques in the internal credit-risk 
systems. These effects are certainly different while using the standardised 
or the IRB approaches. 
Indeed, according to a study by the Bank of England,81 which sought 
to estimate the extent to which banks would downgrade loans in a 
recession, ratings based on Moody’s approach lead to little, if any increase 
of capital requirements, whereas ratings based on a Merton-type model82 
lead to an increase of 40 to 50%.83 The strong reactivity of the more 
sophisticated risk-assessment models (such as Merton-type models) is 
mainly related to the correlation of the probabilities of default to the 
economic cycle. Indeed, the probabilities of default are lower when the 
economic conditions are favourable and higher when the economy 
experiences a downturn. Confirming these conclusions, Altman et al. (2002) 
investigated the link between probabilities of default and loss given default 
and the effects of procyclicality on capital requirements. They found that 
banks that estimate probabilities of default and loss-given default had to 
reduce their credit portfolios to a larger extent, compared with banks that 
only estimate PDs and rely on supervisory estimates of LGDs. This finding 
provides clear evidence that the procyclicality of the Accord is more 
prominent when using the advanced IRB approach.  
When the economy is in a downturn, the high risk-sensitivity of Basel 
II may indirectly exacerbate the deterioration of SME financial conditions 
since banks are more likely to cut credit because of the overall deterioration 
                                                      
81 See Catarineu-Rabell et al. (2003). 
82 A Merton model or structural credit risk model was first proposed by Black and 
Scholes’ and developed by Robert Merton in 1973 in his seminal paper on option 
pricing, as well as in a more detailed paper in 1974. Merton had in fact anticipated 
the model earlier in 1970. This fact, along with his active support of the work of 
Black and Scholes, is why the model is often referred to by his name. 
83 Similar results were found in Kashyap and Stein (2003); see also Jordan et al. 
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of the asset quality. At the same time, the payment behaviour of companies 
is very likely to deteriorate, which typically undermines SMEs’ commercial 
transactions. This would create cash imbalances due to late payments, 
casting additional doubt on SMEs’ creditworthiness and as a consequence 
would curb lending even more. Reduced lending would have a direct 
negative effect on growth, suggesting that some corrective measures 
should be put in place to avoid exacerbating the cycle.  
Against this background, when asking bankers whether the new 
Basel Accord would make lending to SMEs less attractive in comparison 
with large companies, a survey by the European Investment Bank 
(Wagenvoort, 2003c) showed that roughly one out of four bankers still 
finds it difficult to assess the possible impact of Basel II on SME lending 
(see Figure 12).  
Figure 12. The likely impact of Basel II on firm lending  
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Source: Wagenvoort (2003c). 
Around 40% of the bankers are of the opinion that lending to 
medium and large firms will remain equally attractive as under current 
banking regulation. With respect to small firms, only 20% of the 
respondents think that Basel II will be neutral for small-firm lending. 
Among those who expect Basel II to have an impact on loans to small firms, 
about half think that Basel II will stimulate lending while the other half 
anticipates a negative impact. In other words, it is expected that there will 
be banks reducing small-firm lending, but this reduction is likely to be 
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confirmed that an overwhelming majority of banks view the SME credit 
business as a core element of their portfolio and showed their interest in 
increasing it. 
In terms of the practical implications for SME lending, the new IRB 
approaches to managing credit risk imply an increase of work to maintain 
updated and completed databases and to review the ratings and the factors 
involved in the modelling process more often. Indeed, there is a strong 
expectation that IRB banks will require their clients (notably SMEs under 
corporate and retail portfolios) to provide more, better structured, focused 
and timely data (financial statements, business plans, etc.) to complete their 
systems and to allow them to produce a precise and adequate ratings 
closely aligned to their risk profile over time. Covenants will become 
standard features of loan contracts (in particular ratings, leverage and 
liquidity) especially for long-term credit and the trend to collateralised 
lending as a means to mitigate credit risk will continue. The most tangible 
changes are the use of a more sophisticated statistical design to derive the 
ratings and the way this information is interpreted when using the most 
sophisticated statistical techniques to convert quantitative and qualitative 
data into ratings and probabilities of default, which will enhance the ability 
to identify potential future defaults. These changes will entail a much 
tighter and more systematic monitoring of creditworthiness of the 
borrower and credit risk overall. Yearly rating will be a common standard 
for banks to help identify problem loans. The monitoring process will be 
based on the data submitted yearly by the clients, and any delay in 
submission will serve as a warning signal and most likely lead to a 
downgrading. These conclusions were confirmed by the majority of banks 
in the McKinsey & Co. survey (European Commission, 2005b).  
On the one hand, Basel II is a revolution in terms of improving risk 
management through the introduction of more risk-sensitive and more 
sophisticated tools borrowed from modern finance theories. But on the 
other hand, it may create a higher burden for some small enterprises 
(notably the potentially low-rated SMEs), which would need to provide 
well-structured and timely financial statements, to keep their bank 
accounts in a straight line with their agreements, to communicate any 
change (in the personnel and capital employed in the firm and arrange the 
successor matters), to provide adequate guarantees and collateral and to 
manage their credit function very carefully. These enterprises could still 
overcome the burden by internally managing their own risk: first, by 
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accurate and timely information about their financial situation to their 
banks; second, by implementing a viable credit management method that 
could be complemented by credit insurance to monitor their clients’ 
payment behaviour and therefore to avoid bad payment habits or coverage 
in the event of insolvencies. This would in turn lead to a more stable cash 
flow and hence may improve the enterprise’s creditworthiness.  
Banks also have the alternative to finance SMEs in the first stages of 
their growth cycle through equity either directly or by investing in private 
equity or venture capital. Under the Basel I Accord, equity positions are 
risk-weighted at 100%, which does not correctly reflect their underlying 
risk profile. The risk weights assigned to these types of exposures, which 
are considered to be high-risk categories, are noticeably higher under the 
new Basel rules. The European Commission’s CRD proposal has 
introduced lower-risk weights to such exposures, as compared with the 
original text of Basel II, but these are still considered to be higher than the 
current rules.  
The new treatment may limit the attractiveness of this type of 
financing. The higher charges imposed on direct-equity financing and bank 
investments in private equity and venture capital business in Europe will 
inhibit banking institutions from investing in such businesses, as they are 
becoming very costly.84 
Some SMEs, in particular those developing new technologies (‘high-
tech’ SMEs) and relying to a certain extent on private equity and venture 
capital financing, will be somewhat affected by this treatment.85 Indeed, 
developing new technologies is considered to be a risky business in 
addition to the uncertainty of expected returns, where the problem of 
information asymmetry is prominent.  
                                                      
84 The role of banks in developing the European private equity and venture capital 
market is essential as banks contribute 25% of all capital committed (EVCA, 2004).  
85 According to a survey of European venture capital conducted by Bottazzi et al. 
(2004), almost 1,300 European firms were financed by European venture capitalists. 
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3.  Measures to improve SME financing under the new rating 
culture 
Banks have been and will continue to be the most important source of 
financing for SMEs in Europe. Today, banks are facing a drastic change in 
the manner they usually conceive their business. Indeed, recent 
developments such as emerging risk-management techniques, financial 
innovation and other drivers linked to the high expectations of 
shareholders and regulators have brought new challenges for banks. 
Hence, they need to run their business with the most accurate tools not 
only to meet expectations but also to position themselves against fierce 
competition. In practice, banks must manage the risks to which they are 
exposed very carefully, with a specific focus on credit risk stemming from 
counterparties of varying risk quality. The SME sector is clearly one in 
which banks are looking to expand – first because SMEs have a high 
potential for innovation and flexibility and second because they foster 
growth. In parallel, the European Commission is committed to creating the 
best possible environment for SMEs to grow and to contribute to the 
realisation of the EU’s Lisbon Agenda of March 2000.  
The new requirements introduced by Basel II in parallel with the 
CRD mirror the trend in the financial industry towards more scientific risk-
measurement and management. Since managing risks is the core of 
business of financial institutions, they ought to do it in the best possible 
way. Hence, the new regulation creates higher incentives for banks to 
assess the risk inherent in each individual exposure: riskier lending will be 
more expensive while safer lending will be less costly. In other words, for 
the banks that choose the IRB methods, there will be no room for cross-
subsidisation. For these types of banks, credit decisions will be based on the 
individual risk quality of each borrower and his or her capacity to repay 
debt over time.  
For SMEs, this will mean that their rating and probability of default 
are the determinant components for credit decisions (acceptance, rejection 
and conditions). They are also going to have a wider range of choices in 
terms of price and credit conditions. Since SMEs will not necessarily be 
aware of these changes, it is important that banks inform them. SMEs will 
also need to expend greater efforts and cooperate in a constructive way.  
At the same time, the public sector should take action in terms of 
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markets, the public sector should act as a catalyst to encourage 
development.   
3.1  The role of banks 
As previously shown, gaps in information between borrowers and lenders 
are among the root causes of financing constraints for SMEs. The 
establishment of a long-term relationship based on increased transparency 
is key to reducing these information asymmetries.86 The new banking 
regulations also cite increased transparency as a precondition for an 
effective cooperation between lenders and SMEs.  
Banks should not hesitate to play their role by informing their 
customers about the changes and showing them how ratings impact their 
credit terms. Communication should not be limited to the reasons for not 
granting bank loans or withdrawing existing credit lines – it should be built 
upon mutual trust between banks and SMEs. Indeed, since ratings and 
associated probabilities of default are becoming the main factor for 
deciding whether or not a bank assigns or extends a line of credit, SMEs 
will need to be informed.  
Therefore, bank procedures – including individual ratings, risk 
assessment and the factors leading to downgrading – will need to be more 
transparent to SMEs. In our interviews with banks, they were asked about 
their plans to disclose the rating process and individual ratings to their 
clients. Only a minority intend to disclose the individual ratings 
voluntarily. The majority plan to inform customers about the main drivers 
of the rating decision to enable them to address the necessary levers 
leading to an improved rating and to mitigate credit risk.87 Obviously, a 
variety of views emanated from these interviews.  
Against these different views, it is advisable to define minimum 
criteria on the level of the transparency required, which is not prejudicial to 
banks in terms of cost increases or competitiveness. Disclosing and 
explaining the overall detailed ratings process to potential clients could 
overburden a bank as it implies mobilising extra human resources. If the 
potential client becomes a loyal customer, the additional costs incurred by 
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87 These conclusions were confirmed by the McKinsey & Co. survey (see European 
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the bank may be passed on as service costs to the customer. If the potential 
client is no longer interested or is shopping around to obtain the best 
ratings, then these costs will be a complete loss. Building on this point, it is 
crucial to define the right amount of disclosure that is both acceptable by 
banks and helpful to SMEs.  
To explore this recommendation, our survey asked banks how they 
perceive an explicit regulation of ratings disclosure to loan applicants. The 
striking majority of respondents were not in favour of such a move since 
they think this would entail an extra regulatory burden.88 In this respect, 
they consider that a non-legislative code of conduct between banks and 
SMEs should suffice to establish a framework that sets out principles on the 
disclosure of ratings and rating processes for banking and SME 
associations.  
We strongly believe that a better disclosure of rating processes by 
banks will improve the new rating culture and also the SME–bank 
relationship in the rating process. It is therefore important to adequately 
define the principles that are the minimum requirements for governing this 
relationship. For example, before the rating process, banks need to inform 
SMEs about: 
1)  the data needed to determine the rating;  
2)  the factors affecting the credit decision (collateral, external ratings, 
etc.);  
3)  the principles of the rating system that will be applied (i.e. those 
covering the retail versus corporate categories); and  
4)  possible ways to improve the rating (better credit management, 
further guarantees, a more defined business plan, etc.).  
After the rating process, banks need to communicate and explain the 
credit decision (acceptance, rejection or likely change of loan conditions) in 
a clear, comprehensible written manner. When updating the ratings 
(generally on an annual basis), banks need to inform their clients well in 
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inadequate, national  legislative measures shall be adopted. The administrative 
costs for the banks have to be at an appropriate rate to the size of the loan” 
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advance to provide the necessary inputs and again provide a written, 
comprehensible explanation of the changes.  
3.2  The role of SMEs  
Adopting one of the IRB approaches under the new banking regulation 
means that banks have to rely extensively on quantitative and qualitative 
information provided by SMEs. This information is essential for running 
the internal rating system properly. Companies that are well managed, 
adequately leveraged (equity ratio) and that provide timely, relevant and 
precise information will be in a position to obtain a better rating and 
consequently better credit conditions. Hence, it is crucial that companies 
understand and accommodate the new capital requirements in order to 
provide the most relevant data needed by lenders to rate their risk 
exposures. Below are the practical actions that SMEs must take to improve 
their ratings.89  
General steps  
1)  Study and understand the bank requirements for granting a loan. 
Financial advice could be seen as an additional solution to make sure 
all the elements are taken into consideration.  
2)  Deliver clear, complete and timely financial and performance data 
needed by lenders to assign yearly ratings for granting a new loan or 
extending an existing line of credit with better conditions. Indeed, 
delayed submission of financial and performance data is seen to be a 
warning signal in many banks’ internal rating systems. It usually 
leads to a downgrading and therefore price increases in new loan 
offers or the refusal of new loans.  
Practical actions 
3)  Improve the factors that are considered to be important in the rating 
process, specifically:  
•  Make sure that cash-flow stabilisation and generation receive 
priority among these efforts, since it is often the key tangible 
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signal with which SMEs can negotiate their creditworthiness. This 
could be done by increasing and diversifying the sources of 
revenues (products and services), the customer and supplier’s 
base and distribution channels, and implementing viable internal 
or external credit-management procedures to monitor clients’ 
payment behaviour (receivables) and therefore avoid bad 
payment habits. Late payment habits from clients should be 
limited since the late or irregular cashing-in of revenues could 
easily drag down the rating and, by limiting the perceived debt 
capacity of the firm, may adversely affect company growth. In 
addition to legislative efforts to combat such malpractices (e.g. the 
EU’s late payment directive), many companies could directly take 
action by (for example) using credit insurance policies to prevent 
and minimise late payments and defaults. Credit insurance could 
offer a complete risk-management tool that helps management to 
put in place the necessary procedures to continuously monitor the 
creditworthiness of clients and reduce the risk of delays and 
defaults.  
•  Increase the equity base by preferring retained earnings over 
distributed profits.  
•  Improve the accounting, controlling and management methods 
within the company where these need attention. Entrepreneurs 
should not only give more importance to the accounting and 
financial functions within the company but also move towards 
more active balance-sheet (or asset liability) management in terms 
of reducing the mismatch between long-term commitment versus 
cash. SMEs should also consider how they manage their liabilities 
as a means to increase competitiveness. In this respect, innovation 
could serve them very well – as it has served banks – to reduce 
the overall amount of risk through the active management of 
liabilities.  
•  Consolidate the business development strategy, encourage 
strategic thinking among managers in terms of the business 
prospects, undertake market/sector/activity analyses and 
improve external communications with stakeholders.  
•  Renew the attention given to some aspects of the business that 
may have been neglected, such as keeping bank accounts in line 
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capital employed in the firm, and determining successor 
arrangements for key staff.  
•  Put in place recovery procedures in the event of crisis scenarios 
such as the loss of a key person in the company, the revaluation of 
a national currency for companies that heavily rely on exports, 
etc.  
4)  Ensure that adequate guarantees and collateral are provided. 
Collateral and guarantees help to obtain better loan conditions. As 
previously noted, the loan pricing policy is mainly influenced by 
rating, term structure (maturity) and collateral. SMEs need to be able 
to provide adequate collateral. The list of credit-risk mitigation 
techniques in Basel II and the CRD is extensive, but these ultimately 
depend on the expected recovery rate (which is a related variable of 
the LGD). For example, the expected recovery rate of cash is almost 
100%, while the expected recovery rate for receivables is between 60 
and 95%. It is advisable for SMEs to look at other types of collateral 
such as credit insurance, which again could offer an indemnification 
for accounts receivable to increase their value when recovery is 
required in the case of default. Credit insurance could also serve as a 
protection for SMEs in countries with high political risks.  
Other specific actions 
5)  Work more proactively to increase equity finance. Many SMEs need 
stronger balance sheets. Venture capital, equity finance and business 
angels are more readily accessible to SMEs that can show high 
growth potential.  
6)  Consider different financing sources. Although it is true that the main 
financing products are provided by banks, it is important for SMEs to 
be able to compare different financing sources to judge which is more 
appropriate to the risk level of the company according to its growth 
cycle. Leasing, factoring and other sources could offer a good 
response to SMEs willing to investigate other financing means, 
particularly for those that have more difficulties providing well-
structured financial and performance data – the basic prerequisites to 
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3.3  The role of public policy  
Improving access to finance is an important aspect of fostering 
entrepreneurship and growth in Europe. Many actions have been already 
been taken at the European and national levels to improve access to 
finance. The purpose of this section is not to enumerate these actions but to 
suggest some improvements to enhance the environment for SME 
financing in the post-Basel II/CRD era.  
1)  There is room for continued improvement in the relationship 
between banks and SMEs in the new rating culture. Thus it is 
important to establish a non-legislative framework (code of conduct) 
that sets out the principles for defining minimum criteria for ratings 
disclosure. 
2)  Access to equity finance could also be improved. As equity finance is 
included in the high-risk category under Basel II and the CRD, banks 
are likely to withdraw from these investments owing to the high risk 
weights assigned to them. At the same time, many SMEs need 
stronger balance sheets that can be translated into a higher equity 
ratio. Hence, at the regional, national and European levels, it is 
important to focus on developing European venture capital markets 
and their liquidity, and to promote the possibilities provided by 
business angels and their networks.  
3)  Since a stronger equity base is a reflection of higher creditworthiness, 
it is important to recognise that retained earnings are the best form of 
financing growth and investment. National governments should 
review whether their tax laws obstruct firm growth by taxing 
retained earnings more than distributed profits.  
4)  Legislative efforts to combat late payment habits need to continue 
and be reinforced to ensure better stabilisation of cash flows, which 
are a prerequisite for better ratings.  
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ANNEX 1. WHAT IS THE CREDIT RISK PREMIUM? 
By taking credit risk and the length of the lending period into account, 
differences in nominal interest rates, at a point in time, can be explained 
with the following equation:  
( ) λ ρ π + + + = } {
*
t market E r i  
The first two components in brackets are the desired rate of return 
and the expected inflation that make up the core of any interest rate at a 
point in time. The third component ‘ρ’ is known as the ‘risk premium’ 
established by credit markets for different categories of risk. This value 
depends on how risk-averse lenders might be at any point of time. The last 
component ‘λ’ is known as the liquidity premium, which represents the 
amount of compensation required by the lender for lending to the long end 
of the market. Let us take an example based on different nominal interest 
rates and different levels of risk associated with a certain class of 
borrowers, as shown in Table A.1. 
Table A.1. Nominal interest rates and different levels of risk for a certain class of 
borrowers 
  No risk  Low risk  Medium risk  High risk 
Term   Treasury   AAA-AA  A-BB B-CC 
Short-term 
(1 year or less)  
1.80%  3.36%  3.95% 5% 
Medium-term 
(1-10 years)  
4.24%  4.46%  5.12% 8% 
Long-term (+10 years)   5.54%  6.21%  6.89% 10% 
Source: Based on Standard & Poor’s (2003). 
E a c h  c o l u m n  r e p r e s e n t s  a  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l  o f  r i s k  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a  
particular category of borrowers. This risk is also known as the credit risk, 
whereby different types of borrowers (or related projects) have different 
probabilities of being able to make scheduled interest payments and to 
repay the principle of the debt. These risk categories are commonly 
established by various credit agencies, the most popular being Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s. 96 | RYM AYADI 
 
The no-risk category corresponds to the government debt (T-bills, T-
notes and T-bonds). In this category, there is an absolute certainty that the 
borrower will be able to properly make scheduled interest payments and 
repay the principle of the debt. The low-risk category corresponds to S&P’s 
classification of AAA-AA, called ‘investment grade lending’. Borrowers in 
this category have a strong history of debt repayment and a strong steam of 
revenues to service any future debt. Lending under this category is 
considered to be for the very risk-averse, who seek to protect their asset 
base by avoiding the borrowers who might default in their debt repayment.  
The classification A-BB represents the somewhat speculative grade of 
medium-risk lending. Borrowers in this category often have a good credit 
history; however, some uncertainty about future revenues to service 
additional debt persists. Lenders involved in these types of loans are 
willing to speculate that all interest payments and principal repayments 
will take place in return for a slightly higher return on their investment. 
Finally, the high-risk category carries a B-CCC rating, also known as 
‘junk’ or highly speculative lending. Lenders in this category are willing to 
put their assets at risk in return for a high return, given the strong 
probability of default carried by this type of asset. Given these risk 
categories, the risk premium is the reward or the additional return for 
holding a risky investment rather than a risk-free one.  
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ANNEX 2. SME CAPITAL REQUIREMENT 
FORMULAS 
For the SMEs classified as retail, the capital requirement formulas 
correspond to the formulas given for other retail exposures. For SMEs in 
the corporate portfolio, the formulas used are those for the corporate 
category, considering the size discount.  
Table A.2. Formulas used for SMEs in the retail and corporate portfolios 
SMEs in the retail portfolio   SMEs in the corporate portfolio 
Correlation = R = 0,03*(1-EXP(-
35*PD))/(1-EXP(-35)) + 0,16*[1-(1-
EXP(-35*PD))/1-EXP(-35)] 
Correlation = R = 0,12*(1-EXP(-
50*PD))/(1-EXP(-50)) + 0,24*[1-(1-
EXP(-50*PD))/1-EXP(-50)] – 0,04*(1-(S-
5)/45) 
Capital requirements = K= LGD*N((1-
R)ˆ(-0,5)*G(PD)+(R/(1-
R)ˆ0,5)*G(0,999))-PD*LGD*(1-1,5*b)ˆ(-
1*(1+(M-2,5)*b)) 
Capital requirements = K= LGD*N((1-
R)ˆ(-0,5)*G(PD)+(R/(1-
R)ˆ0,5)*G(0,999))-PD*LGD 
G(x) is the inverse of the standard 
normal cumulative distribution 
function  
Maturity adjustment = b= (0,11852-
0,05478*LN(PD)ˆ2) 
Source: BIS (2004). 
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ANNEX 3. A GLANCE AT THE TREATMENT OF 
PURCHASED RECEIVABLES UNDER 
BASEL II
∗ 
Eligible purchased receivables are divided into retail and corporate 
receivables. SME receivables fall under both categories.  
1.  If SME receivables are qualified under the retail category, the 
purchasing bank that complies with the internal ratings-based (IRB) 
rules for retail exposures is eligible for the following ‘top-down’ 
approach. For this type of asset, there are IRB charges for both default 
risk and dilution risk.  
To assess the default risk, the bank must provide estimates for 
probability of default (PD) and loss-given default (LGD) for the 
receivables on a stand-alone basis without regard to any assumption 
of recourse or guarantees from the seller or other parties.  
Dilution refers to the possibility that the receivable amount is 
reduced through cash or non-cash credit to the receivables’ obligor. 
Examples include offsets or allowances arising from returns of goods 
sold, disputes regarding product quality, possible debts of the 
borrower to a receivable obligor and any payment or promotional 
discount offered by the borrower (e.g. a credit for cash payments 
within 30 days). To assess dilution risk, the purchasing bank must 
estimate a one-year expected loss for dilution risk also expressed in a 
percentage of the receivables amount. To estimate the expected loss, 
the bank can utilise external and internal data and the estimate must 
be computed on a stand-alone basis. To calculate the risk weights for 
dilution risk, the PD must be set equal to the estimated expected loss 
and the LGD must be set at 100%; a one-year maturity could be 
applied under the supervisory discretion. This treatment applies to 
whether underlying receivables are corporate or retail exposures.   
2.  If SME receivables are qualified under the corporate category, their 
treatment depends on whether they are eligible for the top-down 
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approach or not. To be eligible for treatment under this approach, 
they must satisfy the following conditions:  
a)  They must be purchased from unrelated, third-party sellers. 
b)  They must be generated on an arm’s length basis between the 
seller and the obligor. 
c)  The purchasing bank has a claim on the proceeds from the pool 
of receivables or a pro-rata interest in the proceeds (first loss 
position, second loss position, etc.). 
d)  The supervisor must set a concentration limit above which 
capital requirements should be calculated. The concentration 
limit may refer to the following parameters: the size of one 
individual exposure relative to the total pool, the size of the 
pool of receivables as a percentage of regulatory capital or the 
maximum size of an individual exposure in the pool.  
To assess the default risk in the eligible purchased corporate 
receivables, two approaches apply.  
a)  Under the IRB foundation approach, if the purchasing bank is 
unable to decompose the expected loss into its PD and LGD in a 
reliable manner, the risk weight is determined from the 
corporate risk weight function using the following 
specifications:  
•  If the bank can demonstrate that the exposures are 
exclusively senior claims to corporate borrowers, an LGD 
o f  4 5 %  i s  u s e d ;  P D  i s  t h e n  c a l c u l a t e d  b y  d i v i d i n g  t h e  
expected loss by this given LGD. 
•  If the PD is a bank’s estimate of the expected loss, LGD is 
set to be 100%. 
  If the purchasing bank is able to estimate PD in a reliable 
manner, the risk weight is determined from the corporate risk 
weight functions according to the specifications of LGD, 
maturity (m) and the treatment of guarantees under the 
foundation approach.  
b)  Under the advanced IRB approach, the purchasing bank will 
provide estimates of the risk parameters internally. 
  If the purchased corporate receivables are not eligible for this 
treatment, their default risk will be assessed as other corporate 
exposures.   
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ANNEX 4. CEPS’ SURVEY ON THE POTENTIAL 
EFFECTS OF THE BASEL II 
FRAMEWORK ON SME FINANCING
∗ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Purpose of the questionnaire  
The creation of the best possible environment for entrepreneurship is at the 
heart of the strategy launched by the European Council in Lisbon. 
Nevertheless, the forthcoming new CRD has sparked concerns that higher 
capital charges will further curb lending to SMEs. Actually, the new 
banking regulation intends to enhance the efficiency of credit allocation by 
giving incentives to a more risk sensitive pricing introduced by the internal 
ratings-based approaches. This will certainly entail variance in capital 
adequacy depending on the individual quality of the SME. As a 
                                                      
∗ The author would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Francesco De 
Rossi in the preparation of this survey.  
HOW TO FILL IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
1)  Answer if your institution is a bank or another financial enterprise liable 
to the application of the new prudential regulation (CAD III-Basel II). If you 
are a representative of a banking association, please forward this 
questionnaire to your members. 
2)  In case of multiple choices please use numbers to rank your answers (start 
from 1 = the most important and avoid any duplication). 
3)  Please note that data will be treated in aggregate for the only purpose of 
internal statistical analysis. CEPS ensures full confidentiality on responses. 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
Name:……………………………………….   Tel:…………………………………… 
Division/Position:…………………………   Email:………………………………… 
Company:……………………………….….   Country:……………………………… 
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consequence, the availability of loan financing will be more conditional on 
an enterprise’s financial strength and its ability to provide relevant 
quantitative and qualitative information. A particular prerequisite to 
improve the enterprise’s financial strength is a smoother settlement of 
commercial transactions. 
The CEPS survey aims at providing statistical evidence to help 
understand banks’ rating procedures, SMEs’ financial structure, and the 
effects of late payments in an atmosphere of dynamic repositioning due to 
the forthcoming banking regulation. The results will serve to publish a 
CEPS report on The New Basel Capital Accord and SME Financing: SMEs and 
the New Rating Culture, expected to be released in mid-2005. 
This questionnaire should be directed to the audit, compliance or risk 
department of your bank.  
 
Banks and Other Financial Institutions 
1.  What is the asset size of your financial institution? 
  less than €100 million in assets    between €100 and €500 million  
  between €500 million and €1 billion    between €1 and €10 billion  
  more than €10 billion in assets  
2.  How does your institution intend to comply with the new regulation as 
regards the computation of capital requirements against credit risk? 
  Standardised Approach (SA)  
  Internal Rating Based (IRB) Approach in the foundation version 
  Advanced IRB approach  
  Partial adoption of the IRB approach (with the use of the Standardised 
Approach for financial institutions’ and sovereigns’ exposures). 
3.  What is the importance of SME financing for the business of your institution? 
  marginal (less than 5% of the assets) 
  relevant (between 5% and 20% of the assets) 
  very important (between 20% and 40% of the assets) 
  predominant (more than 40% of the assets)  
Comments……………………………………………………………………………… 
4.  What proportion of your institution’s overall SME exposure fulfils the 
requirements (small and granular credits) to be qualified as retail portfolio?  
  less than 20%    between 20% and 50%  
  between 50% and 70%     more than 70% 102 | RYM AYADI 
 
5.  Please provide a brief description of the composition of your institution’s SME 
portfolio in terms of credit quality.    
  …….% of SME exposures has very little risk (top rating) 
  …….% of SME exposures has a moderate risk (good rating) 
  …….% of SME exposures is reasonably risky (decent rating)    
  …….% of SME exposures is risky (low rating) 
  …….% of SME exposures has a high risk (bad rating)  
  …….% of SME exposures has already shown difficulties (past due loans, etc.) 
Others/comments………………………………………………………………. 
6.  What types of techniques are generally used by your institution to decide 
whether to provide credit or not, and under what conditions, to SMEs? 
    financial statement analysis with a strong focus at the applicant firm level  
    the applicant firm is sorted into credit merit clusters by means of 
quantitative methods based on ‘hard’ information (market analysis, 
macroeconomic indicators, balance sheets ratios, cash flow and financial 
statement data)  
     use of ‘soft’ information directly collected by loan officials from past or 
similar credit relationships (such as knowledge of local businesses, or of 
personal, credit and entrepreneurial past history of managers and owners 
of the firm)      
    credit granting considerably relies upon the external ratings of the 
applicant firm   
     credit scoring, the applicant is assigned a ‘score’ by quantitative methods 
that elaborate on ‘hard’ information and, at least for the part that can be 
captured by index variables, on ‘soft’ information also  
    requests of funding are mostly assessed on grounds of collateral presented   
    a mix of these techniques or others, please give some comments:……........... 
If your institution provides internal ratings to SME exposures, please spend an 
extra moment to clarify some technical details about: 
a)  What are the elements you include in loan pricing?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
b)  What is the rating scale adopted? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
c)  How does your institution translate ‘credit scores’ into ratings?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
d)  What is the link between the rating scale and the estimates of the 
probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD) required by Basel 
II adopted by your institution? 
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7.  To the extent that your institution assesses applicants’ creditworthiness by 
processing ‘hard’ information (financial statements, credit scoring and other 
quantitative methods), the relevant datasets are obtained from:   
    your own bank databases 
    private external credit bureaus 
    public credit registries  
    membership in cooperative credit bureaus  
8.  How often does your bank update its internal credit risk assessment (ratings)? 
    each quarter or more often    twice a year   
    about once per year    once every two years or more   
9.  Please indicate which, if any, of the following events generally cause 
downgrading of SMEs according to the assessment of your institution:  
 Macroeconomic  factors 
    worsening of macroeconomic conditions 
  increase of sovereign risk of the country where SMEs are located  
  tightening of monetary conditions (high interest rates) 
  higher volatility of commodity prices  
  reduction of exports 
  exchange rate appreciation 
Others………………………………………………………………………….  
  Business and financial factors 
    loss of market shares   
  expansion in new and unexplored businesses 
  lower innovation capacity (for instance measured through R&D investments) 
  increase in long-term debt  
  liquidation of financial assets 
  increase in outstanding trade credit 
  increase in merchandise disputes with suppliers/clients 
  late payments from clients 
Others…………………………………………………………………………………… 
  Factors related to governance  
  separation of ownership from control  
  change of managers 
  drop of relationship with the firm’s principal creditor (generally a bank) 
  loss of technical personnel  
  change/death of principal owner/s 
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10.  Please identify the risk mitigation techniques generally used by your company 
to secure exposures to SMEs. 
    mortgages of commercial real estate specifically to secure long-term credit 
    pledge of inventories and equipment to secure short/medium-term loans    
  to secure short/medium-term loans financial assets are generally preferred  
  pledge of financial assets is required also to secure long-term loans 
    personal guarantees from the principal owner/s† 
    guarantees from affiliate or parent firms 
    credit derivatives/insurance 
 Others…………………………………………………………………………………. 
  Please indicate the major effects of the provision of guarantees from SMEs:  
    crucial to grant credit 
    lowers the cost of credit 
    increases credit lines and/or extends their duration    
    consents to relax or avoid some tight credit covenants 
    a mix of these effects, please explain…….…………………………..……………. 
 Others………………………………………………………………................................ 
11.  Does your institution provide factoring facilities to SMEs?  
    no 
    accounts receivable are discounted but not within proper factoring agreements 
  yes, but mainly agency factoring (sales ledger and debt collection)  
  yes, about ……% of our SME financing derives from factoring invoices, and 
……% of these contracts are signed under non-recourse terms  
 
                                                      
† Such as mortgages on residential properties or other pledges of personal estate. 
Please remember to include, if any, similar pledges from the principal owner’s 
direct associates.   
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